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Throughout the world and across time, people view happiness as an 
important life goal. In the late nineties, a college sample of more than seven 
thousands respondents in 42 countries, including countries that are not fully 
westernized, reported that they think about their happiness often, and that 
happiness and life satisfaction are very important to them (Suh et al., 1998). Similarly, 
several findings show that happiness has been perceived as one of the most 
important goals in life and the most important component of quality of life (e.g., 
Diener & Oishi, 2004; King & Broyles, 1997; King & Napa, 1998). Nowadays, people 
seem to have similar views on the importance of happiness as people twenty years 
ago. For example, a recent survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) shows that happiness (i.e., life satisfaction) was among the top 
important indicators of a better life as expressed by more than 160,000 citizens 
around the world, including from countries where the economic conditions may be 
very poor (BLI Data Services V2, 2020). 
People are made aware of the importance of happiness in various ways 
nowadays. For example, there has been a rapid increase in the number of books on 
happiness during the past decades. The Library of Congress stored as few as 25 
books on how to be happy written in the 19th century. The number was increasing 
to 380 books in the 20th century, and to 936 books only in the past two decades. 
People can easily find guidance on how to be happy through the Internet. A Google 
search for “happiness” yields 832 million results and there are nearly 70,000 books 
on happiness available for purchase on Amazon.com. As a related example, recent 
findings show that people can have the impression that other people are living 
happier lives than themselves (Chou & Edge, 2012), as a result of being exposed to 
the flawless Facebook and Instagram profiles, pictures and status updates of others 
on social media (Zhao et al., 2008).  
In addition to its personal importance to individuals, the importance of 
happiness as a societal goal was recognized by the 19th century utilitarian 
philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, who advocated that the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number of people should be the basis of morals and legislation. 
Furthermore, the preamble of the American Declaration of Independence identifies 
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the pursuit of happiness as an unalienable right, along with life and liberty (Kesebir 
& Diener, 2008). More recently, the United Nation (UN) General Assembly in its 
resolution 66/281 (United Nations, 2012) invites the Member States, organizations 
and civil society to observe the International Day of Happiness every year on March 
20 as a recognition of “the relevance of happiness and well-being as universal goals 
and aspirations in the lives of human beings around the world and the importance 
of their recognition in public policy objectives.” The resolution states that “the pursuit 
of happiness is a fundamental human goal.” In accordance to this invitation, the 
movements to develop happier and more caring societies emerged in several nations 
(e.g., Rosenthal, 2015) and the attempts to rank countries based on the level of the 
perceived happiness of their citizens has been made annually since 2012 (e.g., 
Helliwell et al., 2020). These facts confirm the notion that people, especially in 
Western cultures, have embraced happiness as one of the most important goals – 
both at an individual level, and for society at large (Veenhoven, 1994). 
With the increasing focus on happiness in society and at an individual level, 
there has also been a rise in research on happiness, and the current introduction will 
provide a brief overview of the general findings in this literature. As will be explained 
in more detail, in the research reported in this dissertation, I seek to contribute to 
this literature by addressing the broader question: How important is happiness really 
in people’s lives? Within this broader question, I address three more specific 
questions: First, do people indeed perceive that it is the societal norm to be happy? 
And how is this happiness norm related to one’s own happiness, and to the pursuit 
of happiness? Second, when we judge others, to what extent does the other person’s 
level of happiness affect our overall judgment of this person? And third, to what 
extent are the choices that we make in life affected by the level of anticipated 
happiness we believe a choice may bring us? I seek to provide answers to these 
questions, thereby testing the general hypothesis that the goal to become happy is 
an intrinsic part of what we do, how we judge others, and what choices we make.  
Definition of Happiness 
In Western culture, the quest to define happiness has begun since the time 
of Ancient Greece when philosophers contemplated the question of what “a good 
life” is. The attempts lead to three perspectives on happiness, namely Eudaimonic 
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Well-being, Hedonic Well-being, and Life Satisfaction (Diener, 2009). First, the 
Eudaimonic Well-being perspective is supported by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) who 
suggested that a good life follows from the exercise of virtuous activities. 
Correspondingly, Zeno (334-262 BCE) argued that a good life is achieved by 
accepting the moment as it presents itself, by maintaining the virtue of the present 
moment, and by not allowing oneself to be controlled by the desire for pleasure or 
fear of pain (Vitterso, 2013). Today’s scholars define Eudaimonic Well-being as “the 
life states associated with using and developing the best in oneself, in accordance 
with one’s true self and one’s deeper principles” (Huta, 2013, p. 201). This so-called 
normative definition describes happiness by external criteria such as virtue or 
holiness. Happiness is thought of as possessing desirable qualities, and virtue is 
prescribed as the normative standard to judge people’s lives (Diener, 1984). This 
conceptualization of the good life has also been endorsed by the belief systems in 
Eastern traditions such as Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Sufism. 
However, eastern and western eudaimonism advocates different positive qualities, 
such that eastern tradition emphasizes selflessness, adjustment to the environment 
and relational virtues, whereas western tradition emphasizes virtues like autonomy 
and environmental mastery (Joshanloo, 2014). 
 Second, whereas Aristotle believed that happiness was the by-product of a 
life of virtue, nowadays happiness is often associated more with the Hedonic Well-
being perspective. According to this view, happiness is achieved by the avoidance of 
pain and pursuit of pleasure, with personal gratification, or with sensory pleasures. 
Thus, this perspective indicates the domination of positive affect over negative affect 
(Bradburn, 1969). This shift from being good to feeling good was apparent in Thomas 
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution, which reflected 
an increasingly popular idea: that happiness is necessary for the health of the 
individual and society. Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism that regarded a good life as 
the maximum surplus of pleasure also led to a new way of conceptualizing happiness 
in terms of pleasure versus pain. This subjective concept can be traced back to the 
Ancient Greeks where Aristippus (435-356 BCE) and Epicurus (341-270 BCE) argued 
that a good life can be achieved by maximizing pleasure and gaining freedom from 
pain, worry, fear, and confusion (Vitterso, 2013).  
Third, scholars suggested that people rely on their own standards when 
determining what the good life is, and can decide for themselves whether they are 
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living good lives or whether his/her life is worthwhile (Diener, 2000, 2009). This 
subjective concept of happiness was also defined as “a global assessment of a 
person’s quality of life according to his own chosen criteria” (Shin & Johnson, 1978, 
p. 478). This Life Satisfaction perspective can be traced back to the time when Marcus 
Aurelius (121-180 AD) wrote that “no man is happy who does not think himself so” 
(Diener, 2009, p. 13).  
In the last several decades, scientific research aimed to study the subjective 
approach to a good life, which focused on both the satisfaction with life and the 
hedonic well-being perspectives. This approach is called “subjective well-being” 
(SWB). As suggested by Diener (2000), this evaluation includes two components, 
namely cognitive and affective evaluations. The cognitive component of happiness 
is life satisfaction (global judgments of one’s life) and satisfaction with important 
domains (e.g., work, marriage). The affective component is positive affect 
(experiencing high levels and frequency of pleasant emotions and moods) and 
negative affect (experiencing low levels and frequencies of unpleasant emotions and 
moods). This may mean either someone is experiencing mostly pleasant emotions 
during the current period of life, or that the person is predisposed to such emotions, 
whether or not he or she is currently experiencing them (Diener, 2009). Hence, happy 
people are those who experience many pleasant and few unpleasant emotions, who 
experience many pleasures and few pains, and who are satisfied with their lives.  
Happiness in the Current Dissertation 
In the present dissertation I will approach happiness in accordance with the 
subjective well-being view on happiness, defining and measuring happiness as 
people’s subjective evaluations of their lives. I suggest that the subjective well-being 
approach may well resemble lay people’s idiosyncratic definition of happiness. As 
mentioned above, happiness consists of cognitive and affective components. The 
relation between these two components has not been as thoroughly researched. 
Therefore, to measure happiness, researchers typically measure each of the 
components separately, or assess global evaluations using single-item scales (Diener, 
2009). For example, Bradburn's (1969) Affect Balance Scale and Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen's (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) assess the affective 
components of happiness as the balance of positive and negative affect experienced 
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during the past weeks. The cognitive component has been assessed with life 
satisfaction inventories such as the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985), 
whereas the global evaluation measures also include single-item scales such as 
Cantril’s Self-Achoring Scale (Cantril, 1965), the Gurin Scale (Gurin et al., 1960), and 
the Self-rating of Happiness (Abdel-Khalek, 2006). 
In an attempt to measure happiness as a general assessment, when I 
measure happiness in the present research in this manuscript, I used the Subjective 
Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). It is a measure of overall 
subjective happiness that is a global, subjective assessment of whether one is a 
happy or an unhappy person. The 4-items scale has good-to-excellent internal 
consistency, good test-retest reliability over periods ranging from three weeks to one 
year (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). More recent research found that the SHS has 
moderate to high correlations with both life satisfaction and positive affect and low 
correlation with playfulness, which provide some evidence for the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the scale (Mattei & Schaefer, 2004). In sum, the current 
dissertation focuses on the subjective well-being approach to define happiness and 
measures it using the global and subjective assessment of people’s own happiness. 
The Determinants of Happiness 
A lot of research has been devoted to examine what determines happiness. 
Much research (see Pavot & Diener, 2013 for a detailed review) has focused on 
examining the role of demographic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, 
income, and religiosity on happiness. The findings suggest that there are no 
significant differences in average level of happiness between men and women, 
although women tend to experience both positive and negative emotion more 
intense than men (Diener et al., 1999). Moreover, happiness tends to increase as 
individuals get older, and declines only at the end of life (Mroczek & Spiro, 2005). 
Married people tend to be happier than people who are not married (Lucas et al., 
2003), and divorced people report lower levels of happiness after divorce than before 
divorce (Lucas, 2005). The impact of money on happiness is strongest for individuals 
living at levels of poverty or near-poverty, but tends to decrease as the level of 
income increases (Diener et al., 2009). The relation between religiosity and happiness 
is yet unclear; some research found positive associations (Argyle & Hills, 2000; Lewis 
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et al., 2005) while others did not (e.g., Lewis et al., 2000; Sillick et al., 2016). In short, 
previous research found various associations between people’s life circumstances 
(i.e., age, marital status, economic status, and religiosity) and their levels of happiness.  
Perhaps surprisingly, as suggested by a theoretical model of the 
determinants of happiness from Lyubomirsky and colleagues (2005), the 
abovementioned life circumstances contribute only about 10% of the variance in 
happiness  (Argyle, 1999; Diener et al., 1999). The model suggests personality traits 
as relatively stable determinants of happiness (i.e., happiness set point) accounting 
for about 50% of the variance in happiness (Braungart et al., 1992; Lykken & Tellegen, 
1996). For example, it has been consistently found that extraversion and neuroticism 
are correlated robustly with the affective component of happiness (Costa & McCrae, 
1980; Steel et al., 2008). The remaining 40% of the variance in happiness is 
determined by intentional activity, that is, a wide variety of things that people do and 
think in their daily lives, such as exercising regularly, being kind to others (e.g., Keltner 
& Bonanno, 1997; Magen & Aharoni, 1991), thinking positively, counting one’s 
blessings (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; King, 2001), and striving for important 
goals (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). In other words, these findings may suggest 
that happiness is for a significant part malleable, determined by the actions and 
choices that people make.  
The Outcomes of Happiness 
Happiness research has also found many substantial beneficial outcomes of 
happiness (see Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, et al., 2005 for review). Such outcomes can be 
categorized into four life domains: social relationships, health and longevity, work, 
and income. High levels of happiness appear to enhance and increase social 
interaction (Fredrickson, 2001). Happy people tend to create their own social support 
systems (Cunningham, 1988). High levels of happiness have also been linked to a 
better functioning immune system (e.g., Dillon et al., 1985), and even longer life 
expectancy (e.g., Danner et al., 2001). The benefits of happiness in the workplace are 
expressed in the form of higher productivity, reliability, and overall work quality (Staw 
et al., 1994). Happier people are likely to earn more money (Diener et al., 2002). In 
sum, the pursuit and experience of happiness is often seen as a hallmark of 
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psychological health (Fredrickson, 1998). Given that happiness brings a lot of benefits, 
it is not surprising that happiness is considered important for people’s life.  
Despite the positive outcomes of happiness, there are some research 
findings that have suggested possible negative consequences. For example, 
experiencing intense levels of happiness may cause disengagement from reality that 
in turn lead to risky behaviours and dysfunction in certain areas of life (Cyders & 
Smith, 2008). Pursuing happiness in a wrong way, such as wanting to be happy too 
much, may decrease people’s well-being and make them lonely (Mauss et al., 2011, 
2012). Recent research found that the link between motivation to pursue happiness 
and well-being is moderated by cultural differences in the extent to which people 
view happiness as a socially engaged concept (i.e., pro-social behaviour and 
relational interdependence; Ford et al., 2015). People who pursue happiness in more 
socially engaged ways report higher level of well-being in collectivistic cultures (that 
tend to view happiness from social engagement) than in individualistic cultures (that 
tend to view happiness from personal achievements). It seems that the occurrence 
of several potential negative outcomes of happiness is influenced by some factors 
such as the intensity and the cultural fit of the experience. Moreover, people in 
general seem to focus and have more awareness on the benefits of happiness. For 
these reasons, people may consider happiness as desirable and important.  
The Present Dissertation 
It should be clear from the above that happiness plays an important role in 
people’s lives. If happiness is truly important, what would be the implication of it? In 
this dissertation, I aim to answer this broad question by addressing some related and 
more specific questions:  
1. If happiness is so important, especially for modern people nowadays, is it 
possible that happiness has shifted from being an ideal to actually being a norm? 
And if so, would it actually and paradoxically undermine people’s happiness? 
Does a happiness norm promote the pursuit of happiness, or actually undermine 
the pursuit of happiness?  
2. If happiness is so important and is even perceived as a norm, how does it affect 
our judgments of others? Do we like and envy happy people (who comply with 
the norm) more so than unhappy people (who divert from the norm)?  
Chapter 1  
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3. If happiness is so important, it can be expected that our choices are for an 
important part driven by the anticipation of how much happiness a certain 
choice would bring. Do people indeed make choices based on what they believe 
makes them more happy?   
These questions will be considered in the different chapters. Below I will 
briefly provide an overview of the studies conducted in every chapter. I will not write 
too much information here as every chapter will give an extensive introduction to 
the studies.  
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between the perceived societal norm 
to be happy (i.e., happiness norm), the tendency to pursue happiness and one’s own 
levels of subjective happiness. A cross-cultural study involving more than one 
thousand participants from The Netherlands, the United States, China and Indonesia 
was conducted to investigate the association between the happiness norm, the 
pursuit of happiness, and subjective happiness, and whether these associations differ 
across cultures. 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between a person’s level of happiness 
and the extent to which people like and envy the person. Three experimental studies 
were conducted, involving a total of five hundred adult participants from the United 
States, to assess participants’ own happiness level and their judgment toward a 
target person in terms of liking and envy, based on a person-description that was 
experimentally varied in the level of happiness. 
Chapter 4 examines the relation between the level of anticipated happiness 
of an option and the likelihood to choose the option given that the decisions are 
made intuitively or deliberatively. In a two-phase online experiment, a total of one 
hundred and forty participants from the United Kingdom and the United States were 
presented by 15 pairs of options one at a time. In phase one, they were asked to 
indicate the extent to which each option would contribute to their happiness. In 
phase two, one-week later participants were randomly assigned to make choice on 
similar pairs of options either by using deliberative thinking or intuitive thinking.  
Chapter 5 outlines the research questions and summarizes the main 
findings of previous studies. The results are discussed in the light of their theoretical, 
methodological and practical relevance. To summarize, the present dissertation looks 
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into support for the claim that happiness is important by testing the general 
hypothesis that the desire to be happy underlies what we do, how we judge others, 
and what choices we make.  
The chapters of this dissertation are written independently and based on 
articles that have been submitted to journals for publication. Therefore, there is some 

















On the relationship between the 
happiness norm, the pressure to be 
happy, and the pursuit of happiness:  




 This chapter is based on: Kumalasari, A. D., Karremans, J., Van der Veld, W. M., Dijksterhuis, A. On 
the relationship between the happiness norm, the pressure to be happy, and the pursuit of happiness: 
A cross-cultural examination. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Abstract 
People value happiness, perhaps more so than ever in present day society. 
In fact, it has been suggested that there may be a societal norm and pressure to be 
happy. The present research aimed to explore the relation between the happiness 
norm, happiness pressure, the pursuit of happiness and subjective happiness across 
different cultures (among 1077 participants from The Netherlands, the United States, 
China, and Indonesia). Using a multi-group Structural Equation Modelling, a 
mediation model was analyzed across these countries simultaneously. Results 
showed that in all countries but the United States, a happiness norm was positively 
associated with subjective happiness. In all countries but the Netherlands, a 
happiness norm was positively associated with the pursuit of happiness. In the United 
States and China, the relation between the happiness norm and subjective happiness 
was mediated by the pursuit of happiness. However, happiness pressure was 
associated with lower subjective happiness, and in the United States this relationship 
was mediated by a diminished pursuit of happiness. In sum, the findings suggest that 
a happiness norm may positively affect subjective happiness as people pursue 
happiness more strongly, while feeling high pressure to be happy negatively affects 
subjective happiness.  
 
Keywords: Individualistic-collective culture; Pursuit of happiness; Social norm; Social 





In the past decades, research has provided insight into the antecedents of 
happiness, into how people sustain and enhance happiness, and also into the variety 
of beneficial outcomes of increased happiness (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2003; 
Keltner & Bonanno, 1997; King, 2001; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; 
Magen & Aharoni, 1991; Seligman, 1991; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001). Such 
research endeavors are consist with the observation that in present day society the 
importance of happiness is emphasized perhaps more strongly than ever 
(Veenhoven, 2009). Since 2012, an annual survey of the state of global happiness 
ranks countries on the level of happiness of their citizens (e.g., Helliwell et al., 2012, 
2020), and the United Nations has announced an International Day of Happiness 
(March 20). Movements to build a happier and more caring society emerged in 
several nations (e.g., Rosenthal, 2015). Moreover, the number of books on happiness 
and how to achieve it is increasing rapidly, and people seem to be reminded daily of 
the importance of happiness through television, newspapers, magazines, social 
media, and the internet. At times it seems that people simply ought to strive for 
happiness. Although many findings demonstrate society’s emphasis on the pursuit 
of happiness, very little is known about how this affects people’s happiness.  
Research has shown that the outcomes of happiness benefit individuals, 
families, and communities in many different life domains, ranging from a positive 
state of mind to successful work outcomes, from positive mental and physical health 
to successful social relationships (see Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005 for 
review). It is therefore not surprising that it seems natural for people to pursue 
happiness in an attempt to obtain these benefits. However, consistent with the 
notion of society’s emphasis on happiness, in the current article we argue that people 
may also pursue happiness because they perceive a strong norm or even a pressure 
to be happy. Below, we explain what we mean by a happiness norm and happiness 
pressure and how they may relate to the pursuit of happiness. And as will be 
explained, we explore these relationships across a number of countries and cultures.  
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The Happiness Norm 
Society’s emphasis on happiness may lead to the emergence of a 
prescriptive norm to be happy that we refer as the happiness norm. According to 
Cialdini and colleagues (1991, p. 203), a prescriptive (or injunctive) norm is a norm 
that characterizes the perception of what most people approve or disapprove. 
Prescriptive norms specify what ought to be done. They constitute the moral rules of 
the group (i.e., society). Indeed, it has been argued that the happiness norm may act 
as a prescriptive norm which suggest that people ought to be happy, grounded in a 
belief that society demands happiness (cf. Alpizar et al., 2005; Veenhoven, 1984) In 
today’s society, this demand can perhaps most clearly be observed in what people 
post on social media. People tend to make positive self-presentations on their 
Facebook or Instagram profiles by posting information and images that are socially 
desirable and positive (e.g. Nadkarni & Hofmann, 2012). These kind of posts usually 
receive many “likes” and “comments” from other users, indicating that they are 
indeed accepted and approved, and the positive or happy images of others may give 
people the impression that others are always happy (Chou & Edge, 2012).  
A prescriptive norm, according to Cialdini and colleagues (1991), may be 
adopted by individuals as a personal belief. In the case of the happiness norm, people 
may believe that high levels of happiness should be achieved. Moreover, a 
prescriptive norm serves to direct behaviour and motivate action particularly when 
the norm is made salient or focused upon (Kallgren et al., 2000). Since people are 
primed nowadays with the importance of happiness on a regular basis, the norm may 
become salient frequently or even chronically. Furthermore, prescriptive norms direct 
behaviour by means of social rewards and punishments. People are motivated to 
behave according to the norm to gain social approval and acceptance. They avoid 
counter-normative behaviour to prevent social disapproval and rejection (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). Based on such considerations, we argue that a perceived happiness 
norm may be associated with a more active pursuit of happiness, as people are 
motivated to adhere to norms. Put differently, in the current research we examine 
the prediction that a perceived happiness norm is positively associated with the 






When most people perceive a certain norm and are motivated to adhere to 
it – and in this case would pursue happiness based on a perceived happiness norm 
– norms can have various benefits, including individual wellbeing and social cohesion. 
However, we propose that the current emphasis on happiness may also lead to 
experienced happiness pressure. According to Rimal and Real (2003), pressure may 
be experienced when one feels that one is being deviant from society. For example, 
by continously seeing happy others (e.g., images on Facebook) people may start 
comparing, and may feel insecure and feel the pressure to be just as happy as all 
others. Indeed, there is good evidence that people engage in social comparison 
when evaluating their own happiness (Easterlin, 2003; Smith et al., 1989). Pressure 
may also be experienced because one worries of losing the benefits of conforming 
with society. For instance, some people may feel pressured or obliged to be happy 
and to pursue hapiness merely because they seek positive evaluations of others and 
to experience the benefits of happiness.  
One consequence of happiness pressure could be that people who are not 
all that happy, and who experience pressure to be happy, start to sense a lack of self-
efficacy and competence. People are less likely to engage in activities for which they 
have low self-efficacy (Van der Bijl & Shortridge-Baggett, 2001) and generally are 
less motivated to act when feeling incompetent (Bandura, 1986). In addition, it is 
possible that happiness pressure leads to reactance, that is, it may elicit behavior that 
opposes the actions being encouraged to adopt (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Buller et al., 
1998). It thus seems reasonable to predict that, whereas a prescriptive happiness 
norm may be associated with a stronger pursuit of happiness, people who experience 
more pressure to be happy (i.e. happiness pressure) may actually pursue happiness 
to a lesser extent (Hypothesis 2).   
Does pursuing happiness lead to more happiness? 
There are good reasons to believe that pursuing happiness can indeed lead 
to more happiness. To give an example, Lyubomirsky and Layous (2013) 
demonstrated that engaging in a 6-week behavioural and cognitive happiness-
enhancing intervention that included performing kind acts and counting one’s 
blessings, increases happiness. Certain virtues, such as gratitude (Emmons & 
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McCullough, 2003) and forgiveness (McCullough et al., 2000), when practiced 
consistently, can bring more happiness. Moreover, a study on 500 ethnically diverse 
students revealed that there are at least 8 strategies of maintaining or increasing 
happiness (e.g., affiliation, partying, mental control, goal pursuit, active and passive 
leisure, religion and direct attempts) that contribute 52% of the variance in subjective 
happiness (Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006).   
Despite such successful attempt of the pursuit of happiness, a growing 
body of research findings suggests that pursuing happiness could also result in 
negative outcomes (Ford & Mauss, 2014). Correlational studies found that individuals 
who strongly value happiness tend to report low levels of emotional well-being and 
high depressive symptoms (Mauss et al., 2011) and are at risk of a major depressive 
disorder (Ford et al., 2014). Valuing happiness is also related to greater loneliness 
(Mauss et al., 2012). Moreover, studies on mental control (Wegner, 1994) suggest 
that striving to alter mood can have ironic effects. Occasionally, when people strive 
to pull themselves out of a bad mood, instead of obtaining a better mood, they feel 
worse as a result. Thus, there are several findings to suggest that there are pitfalls 
when explicitly attempting to pursue happiness. It seems that pursuing happiness 
does not necessarily lead to more happiness.  
In addition to Hypotheses 1 and 2, we explored the association between 
the level of happiness pursuit, and self-reported happiness. According to the 
reasoning in the previous paragraph, it may be the case that a stronger perceived 
happiness norm may be associated with more pursuit of happiness (hypothesis 1) 
which in turn might be associated with higher levels of happiness, while more 
perceived happiness pressure may be associated with less pursuit of happiness 
(hypothesis 2), which in turn might be associated with lower levels of happiness. In 
other words, we argue that there is an indirect relationship between happiness norm 
(and pressure) and subjective happiness through the pursuit of happiness. Figure 1 
is the conceptual model that represents these relationships. The primary goal of the 
current research was to examine the associations between the happiness norm, 
happiness pressure, the pursuit of happiness, and subjective levels of happiness, as 
depicted in the model in Figure 1. 
As a secondary goal, we explored these predictions across a variety of 




variables of interest generalize across different cultures, ranging on individualism 
versus collectivism (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, it is also possible that the 
proposed associations between perceived happiness norm, happiness pressure, 
happiness pursuit, and subjective happiness may differ among different cultures. 
Research involving students from 42 Eastern and Western countries (see Suh et al., 
1998) showed that concerns about happiness were high in all of the countries 
surveyed. However, a literature review by Joshanloo and Weijers (2014) revealed that 
the importance of happiness is most strongly experienced in more individualistic 
societies, particularly in the United States (Eid & Diener, 2001; Held, 2002; Menon, 
2012). Moreover, research suggests that personal happiness is more strongly 
emphasized in individualistic cultures than in collectivistic cultures (e.g., Ahuvia, 2001; 
Mesquita & Albert, 2007). Whereas Westerners feel a strong pressure to attain and 
express personal happiness, East Asians tend to feel a certain pressure to bring about 
and experience social harmony (Suh, 2000). Thus, it seems likely that the relationship 
between perceived happiness norm, perceived happiness pressure, and the 
perceived pursuit of happiness is stronger in individualistic countries than in 
collectivistic countries.  
 
 
Figure 1: The conceptual model representing the hypothesized relationships between the 
perceived happiness norm (HPNRM), the perceived pressure to be happy (HPPRS), the pursuit 
of happiness (HPPUR), and subjective happiness (HPSBJ). 
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In sum, the current study aimed to answer several research questions. First, 
is there a relation between the perceived happiness norm and the pursuit of 
happiness, and between the perceived happiness pressure and the pursuit of 
happiness, and are these relationships associated with increases or decreases in the 
level of subjective happiness? Second, do these relations differ between countries 
that traditionally endorse more collectivistic worldviews (i.e., Indonesia and China), 
and more individualistic worldviews (i.e., the United States and The Netherlands). 
Specifically, we explored whether the perceived happiness norm and perceived 
happiness pressure may be more strongly related to the pursuit of happiness and 
the subjective happiness in individualistic Western countries as compared to 
collectivistic Eastern countries.  
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
A total of 1077 university students from The Netherlands, the United States 
(as individualistic countries; ranked respectively  as the 1st and the 6th among 76 
countries on the Individualism Index Values/IDV; Hofstede et al., 2010) and Indonesia 
and China (as collectivistic countries; ranked respectively as the 70th and the 59th on 
the IDV) participated in the study. Table 1 shows the participants’ characteristics. In 
the United States, participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) – an online participant pool. Participants were included if they were 
university students residing in the United States. In the Netherlands and China, 
participants were recruited at a single university, while the Indonesian sample 
consisted of students from two different universities. Participants provided their 
informed consent to participate and were given compensation (i.e. money, souvenirs 
















The Netherlands United States China Indonesia 
N 254 254 271 298 
Age range 
(years) 
17-29 18-45 16-21 16-22 
Age mean 
(years) 
20.06 24.54 18.63 19.24 
Female (%) 85.8 38.2 52.4 74.5 
 
In the United States and The Netherlands, participants who agreed to 
participate completed an online questionnaire. In Indonesia and China, participants 
were recruited at the university campus. If they agreed to participate, they were asked 
to complete a paper-and-pencil questionnaire on the spot. Participants were asked 
to complete the Happiness Norm Scale, the Happiness Pressure Scale, the Pursuit of 
Happiness Scale - developed for the current research pursuit (see Supplemental 
Material) - and the Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) on 7-
point Likert scales. These measures were included as parts of a larger questionnaire.  
The Dutch and the United States students completed the English version of 
the questionnaires. Dutch university students receive most of their course materials 
in English and are used to express themselves in English. The questionnaire was 
translated into Bahasa for Indonesian students and into Chinese for the Chinese 
students. The translations were checked using a back-translation procedure (Brislin, 
1986). 
Measures 
Happiness Norm Scale (HNS) 
The HNS was developed to measure the level of perceived presence of a 
happiness norm. The happiness norm was operationalized as the extent to which 
participants agree with statements implying a belief that society promotes a norm to 
be happy. Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 5 
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statements (e.g. “The norm in today’s society is to be as happy as possible”, “Society 
encourages people to strive for happiness”), that could be scored on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicate stronger 
perceived presence of a happiness norm. The internal reliability of the HNS is 
adequate (Cronbach’s α = .86). All items of the scales can be found in the 
Supplemental Material. 
Happiness Pressure Scale (HPS) 
HPS consists of 5 items measuring the level of perceived happiness pressure. 
Happiness pressure was operationalized as the extent to which participants agree 
with statements describing negative feelings or thoughts experienced as a 
consequence of the perceived pressure to be happy. Participants were asked to 
indicate their level of agreement with each statement on the HPS (e.g., “I experience 
today's norm to be happy as a burden”, “I feel society’s pressure to be happy”), that 
could be scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Higher scores indicate more happiness pressure. The HPS has an adequate internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .75).   
Pursuit of Happiness Scale (PHS) 
PHS measures the extent to which people perceive themselves to pursue 
happiness. Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with 9 
statements (e.g. “I spend most of my time trying to be happy”, “I make strong efforts 
to feel happier than I am now”), that could be scored on 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a higher level of the 
pursuit of happiness. The PHS has adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
However, as we explain in more detail in Appendix 1, based on measurement 
invariance tests we retained only 5 items for the final analyses.  
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS)  
SHS is a widely used scale measuring “global, subjective assessment of 
whether one is a happy or an unhappy person” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 139). 
The scale consists of 4 items, 2 of which assess self-perceptions based on absolute 




descriptions of happy and unhappy individuals, and ask respondents to rate the 
extent to which descriptions are accurate of themselves using 7-point Likert scale. 
Higher scores indicate higher level of happiness. SHS has good-to-excellent internal 
consistency, good test-retest reliability over periods ranging from three weeks to one 
year, as well as good convergent and discriminant validity (Lyubormirsky & Lepper, 
1999).  
Data Analyses 
The aim of this study is to test the relationship between happiness norm, 
happiness pressure, the pursuit of happiness, and subjective happiness, and to 
explore possible differences in these relationships between The Netherlands, the 
United States, Indonesia, and China. In order to test our hypotheses, we performed 
several analyses. In the first step we estimated the factor model separately for each 
construct while simultaneously testing for configural and metric invariance (Meredith, 
1993). Both forms of invariance are required to make valid comparisons of 
relationships across groups or cultures. In the second step we extended the model 
from the first step, by combining the separate multigroup factor models into a larger 
multigroup mediation model. The mediation hypotheses are depicted in Figure 1. 
We analysed the data with LISREL 8.8 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) using the robust 
maximum likelihood procedure (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). This procedure is used 
because the data are not perfectly normally distributed. Structural equation models 
are often evaluated using fit indices (e.g., the RMSEA, GFI) with fixed critical values. 
This practice has received its share of criticism (e.g., Marsh et al., 2004). We use an 
alternative procedure developed by Saris, Satorra, and Van der Veld (2009). This 
procedure takes the power of the test into account in the decision whether a 
constrained parameter is a misspecification or not. We used the JRule Software (Van 
der Veld & Saris, 2011), which reads the output of a Lisrel analysis, to find 
misspecifications in the model that we analyzed. For the analyses we used the JRule 
settings as described in van der Veld and Saris (2011). 
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Results 
The Measures’ Metric Invariance 
The first step of our data analysis was testing the configural and metric 
invariance of the measures. Results show that overall, the happiness norm scale, the 
happiness pressure scale, the pursuit of happiness scale and the subjective happiness 
scale were all partial metric invariant. This means that the scales can be used to validly 
compare the relationships between these constructs across the different countries 
(see Appendix 1 for the detailed results).  
Direct and Indirect Relations between Latent Variables 
As the second step, we analyzed a multigroup (4 countries) mediation 
model simultaneously with a measurement model. The specification of the 
measurement model was copied from the measurement invariance analysis. In fact, 
here we used the same set of restrictions as in the metric invariance analysis. Figure 
2 contains the estimates of the direct and indirect effects between latent variables 
across countries.  
How are perceived happiness norm, perceived happiness pressure, and 
pursuit of happiness related? Figure 2 shows the cross-cultural differences and 
similarities in the relationships between these variables. First, in line with Hypothesis 
1, in all countries the level of perceived happiness norm was positively associated 
with the level of pursuit of happiness (albeit non-significant in The Netherlands). 
Second, in line with Hypothesis 2, we found some support that perceived happiness 
pressure was negatively related with the level of pursuit of happiness, however, this 
was only the case in Indonesia and the United States, and not in The Netherlands 
and China. Third, perceived happiness norm was positively related with subjective 
happiness in all countries (but non-significant in the United States), while perceived 
happiness pressure was, as predicted, negatively related with subjective happiness in 
all countries. This effect was somewhat stronger in The Netherlands and the United 
States than in China and Indonesia. Fourth and additionally, perceived happiness 




However, this relation was not observed in the United States and Indonesia, and was 
in fact negative in China. 
 
Figure 2: Standardized estimates of direct and indirect effects between latent variables 
across countries. Standardized estimates of indirect effects are shown below each model. 
*p = <.05. US the United States, NL The Netherlands, CH China, IN Indonesia. HPNRM 
happiness norm, HPPRS happiness pressure, HPPUR pursuit of happiness, HPSBJ subjective 
happiness. 
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Regarding indirect effects (see indirect effect estimates in Figure 2), we 
observed that in the United States, perceived happiness norm and perceived 
happiness pressure both had an indirect effect on subjective happiness, through the 
perceived pursuit of happiness. In China perceived happiness norm (but not 
perceived happiness pressure) had an indirect effect on subjective happiness 
through the perceived pursuit of happiness. In the Netherlands and Indonesia, both 
perceived happiness norm and perceived happiness pressure had no significant 
indirect effect via perceived happiness pursuit on subjective happiness.  
Discussion 
The study presented in this chapter was designed to explore the relation 
between a happiness norm, happiness pressure, the pursuit of happiness and actual 
subjective happiness. Moreover, we examined these associations in individualistic (i.e. 
the United States and The Netherlands) and collectivistic (i.e. Indonesia and China) 
countries. We found that across countries except for The Netherlands, the perception 
of a happiness norm was directly associated with more pursuit of happiness, and in 
all countries but the United States, the perceived happiness norm had a positive 
relationship with subjective happiness. Furthermore, in the United States and China 
the relation between the perception of a happiness norm and subjective happiness 
was mediated by the pursuit of happiness. Specifically, there was positive association 
between the happiness norm and happiness pursuit, which in turn was associated 
with more subjective happiness. We also found that across countries happiness 
pressure was directly associated with low levels of subjective happiness, and in the 
United States this relationship was mediated by a lowered pursuit of happiness. 
Together, these findings suggest that the perception of happiness norm and 
happiness pressure are differentially associated with the pursuit of happiness and 
subjective happiness.  
Our results showed that across all countries, except The Netherlands, 
perceived happiness norm was directly related with more pursuit of happiness. This 
finding supports the notion that social norms can motivate people and direct their 
actions towards complying with the norm (Cialdini et al., 1991). Although the 
happiness norm may have certain negative connotations, it seems that the happiness 




to (e.g. alcohol use; Borsari & Carey, 2003; food consumption; Mollen et al., 2016). In 
the United States, China and Indonesia, the more participants perceived the 
happiness norm the more they pursued happiness, suggesting that becoming aware 
of a societal norm to be happy motivates participants to strive for happiness. For 
Dutch participants, however, the association between the two variables was not 
statistically significant. It seems that their perception of happiness norm did not 
motivate them to pursue happiness. Although speculative, one explanation might be 
that the Dutch participants are very happy to begin with. They have been ranked as 
the world 6th happiest country among 153 countries by The World Happiness Report 
(Helliwell et al., 2020). Even among people who perceive a strong happiness norm, 
current contentment may prevent further motivation to pursue happiness. 
We also observed that, in all countries except the United States, the 
happiness norm was directly associated with more subjective happiness. The more 
participants perceived the norm to be happy, the happier they were. Although we 
expected this association to be mediated by higher levels of happiness pursuit, we 
did not find much evidence for this (except in the United States and partly in China, 
where there was an indirect effect from the happiness norm to pursuit of happiness 
to subjective happiness). Finding evidence for mediation by the pursuit of happiness 
is not unimportant. After all, a mere relation between a happiness norm and 
subjective happiness could be the result of people judging themselves in line with 
the perceived norm. 
The most consistent finding in this study was that in all countries, happiness 
pressure was negatively associated with subjective happiness. The more participants 
experienced the pressure to be happy, the less happy they were, which was in line 
with our prediction that experiencing a pressure to be happy might prevent its 
attainment. We predicted that the pursuit of happiness could explain the relation 
between the happiness pressure and subjective happiness. Indeed, the data in the 
United States were in line with this prediction: the more participants experienced the 
pressure to be happy, the less they pursued happiness, and in turn, the less happy 
they were. One possibility is that people who are not all that happy to begin with 
and who experience pressure may suffer from the belief that they do not live up to 
a norm. They may become insecure, and even less happy. Another possibility is that 
they experience reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). It could be that people who 
experience a strong pressure to be happy may feel that they lose their freedom to 
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experience whatever feelings they have. This may motivate them to restore this 
freedom by resisting or acting counter to the enforced behavior, that is by resisting 
to pursue happiness, which in turn impeded their happiness. Of course, these 
interpretations are based on non-experimental research, leaving open other 
possibilities. It is possible that less happy people experience more pressure to be 
happy. Less happy people usually have low efficacy expectations (Maddux, 2012). 
They believe that they are less capable than other people to perform a particular 
action, and hence may avoid these actions (such as engaging in happiness-
enhancing activities). Thus, any norm induction of the importance of happiness could 
be experienced as a strong pressure by less happy people. 
Our findings provide additional evidence to the claim made by other 
researchers (Ford & Mauss, 2014; Mauss et al., 2011) that pursuing happiness could 
result in negative outcomes. The work of Mauss and her colleagues (2011) suggests 
that valuing happiness can lead to greater loneliness. Likewise, here we show that 
experiencing pressure to be happy may predict or at least be associated with lowered 
happiness. In the introduction, we implied that perceiving a happiness norm and 
experiencing pressure to be happy may go hand in hand. However, only in The 
Netherlands we found that these variables were positively correlated, such that Dutch 
participants experienced more pressure to the extent that they perceived a stronger 
happiness norm. The two variables were not associated in the United States and 
Indonesia. Interestingly, in China we found the opposite pattern, such that the more 
participants perceived happiness norm the less they experienced happiness pressure. 
It is somewhat difficult to interpret these different findings across countries. One 
explanation might have to do with China being a more restraint country as suggested 
by Hofstede (2011). Restraint stands for a society that controls gratification of needs 
and regulate it by means of strict social norms. In more restraint countries, people 
are more likely to think that what happens to them is not their own doing (Hofstede, 
2011). Perhaps, even though they perceive a relatively strong happiness norm, 
Chinese participants are less likely to experience happiness pressure as a result of 





Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions 
Albeit with several potentially important and interesting inconsistencies 
across the countries, in general our findings demonstrated that the happiness norm 
and happiness pressure can be reliably measured, and are reliably associated with 
subjective happiness and the pursuit of happiness. An obvious limitation of this study 
is that the data are cross-sectional, and thus we cannot be sure of the causal 
relationship between a happiness norm, happiness pressure and the pursuit of 
happiness and subjective happiness. In future experimental and longitudinal research, 
the direction of these causal effects should be examined further.   
While happiness research has focused strongly on personal circumstances 
and individual characteristics that contribute to or undermine personal happiness, 
very little is known yet about how societal norms about happiness are being 
perceived, what determines them, and how they may affect people’s happiness. The 
present research was an initial exploration of these issues, and opens various avenues 
to examine additional questions. For example, what individual factors are associated 
with perceiving and adhering to the happiness norm? What cultural factors are 
associated with the happiness norm, e.g. in which societies is the happiness norm 
perceived particularly strongly? Does indulgence versus restraint of a culture and 
economic development play a role? What determines whether a happiness norm is 
perceived as pressure? Does happiness pressure lead to other negative 
consequences such as perceived stress and loneliness? The present findings, and the 
measures we developed, provide a springboard to further explore such questions, 
and should give us more insight into the broader question of how societal norms 
about happiness affect happiness.  
Conclusions 
The current study is one of the first studies to examine the role of societal 
norm to be happy on subjective happiness across a number of different societies. 
Reliable measures were developed to measure a happiness norm, happiness pressure 
and pursuit of happiness across various countries. The measures and these 
preliminary outcomes open an opportunity for further investigating the happiness 
norm and happiness pressure, and their determinants and consequences.  
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Appendix 1  
Results of the Measurement Invariance Test 
Happiness Norm Scale (HNS) 
The test of configural invariance indicated several misspecifications in the 
model. After solving these misspecifications and re-estimating the model we 
continued to test the metric invariance; that is, we added equality constraints across 
the countries on the factor loadings of the same item (item number 1). Table 2 shows 
the factor loadings for each item across countries after the metric invariance test. The 
test indicated that two items (2 and 3) were not metric invariant in China, while item 
number 4 was not metric invariant in Indonesia. The results indicated that the 
Happiness Norm Scale was partial metric invariant. 
 
Table 2 
Within group standardized factor loadings of the Happiness Norm Scale. 
 
Scale Items NL US CH IN 
I think there is a norm in society that people should strive 
for happiness 
.46 .56 .46 .46 
I think that people in my social environment believe that 
everybody should try to be happy 
.48 .55 .65† .49 
The norm in today’s society is to be as happy as possible .75 .83 .72† .75 
Society encourages people to strive for happiness .71 .85 .62 .53† 
It is as if the norm in society is that people ought to be 
happy 
.76 .83 .42 .74 







Happiness Pressure Scale (HPS)  
After solving several misspecifications and re-estimating the model on the 
configural invariance test, we used item number 5 as the reference indicator in the 
metric invariance analysis, see Table 3. This table shows the factor loadings for each 
item across countries after metric invariance test. The test indicated that item number 
1 in the United States and China, and item number 2 in Indonesia were not invariant. 
The results indicated that the Happiness Pressure Scale was partial metric invariant. 
 
Table 3 
Within group standardized factor loadings of the Happiness Pressure Scale 
 
Scale Items NL US CH IN 
I feel society’s pressure to be happy. .67 .50† .33† .51 
Current society’s emphasis on happiness makes me insecure. .65 .71 .67 .99† 
The idea that everybody should be happy bothers me.  .75 .87 .76 .58 
I experience today's norm to be happy as a burden. .83 .89 .77 .61 
I am sometimes annoyed by current society's emphasis on happiness. .74 .88 .81 .60 
Note: NL = The Netherlands, US = United States, CH = China, IN = Indonesia. †Non-
invariance estimates. 
 
Pursuit of Happiness Scale (PHS) 
After solving several misspecifications, the configural invariance test 
showed that the factor loadings were still very poor for several items. To solve the 
problem, we omitted 4 items that had factor loadings lower than .4 in most/all 
countries (i.e. item number 3, 6, 8, and 9, see the Supplementary Online Material) and 
left the other 5 items for further analysis. The factor loadings were, except for item 5 
and 7 in China, acceptable (>.4). We decided to accept this solution and retained 
both items because they were still acceptable in the other countries. The metric 
invariance test, using item number 5 as the reference indicator, indicated that items 
number 1 and 2 in China were not metric invariant. The results indicated that the 
Happiness Pressure Scale was partial metric invariant. The final results of a metric 
invariance test for Pursuit of Happiness Scale are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Within group standardized factor loadings of the Pursuit of Happiness Scale 
 
Scale Items NL US CH IN 
1. Feeling happy is extremely important to me. .53 .59 .70† .62 
2. To have a meaningful life, I need to feel happy most of the time. .53 .62 .74† .50 
3. I spend most of my time trying to be happy. .73 .84 .42 .72 
4. I often engage in activities that I believe will help me to feel happier. .60 .81 .33 .64 
5. I make strong efforts to feel happier than I am now. .52 .69 .34 .59 
Note: NL = The Netherlands, US = United States, CH = China, IN = Indonesia. †Non-invariance 
estimates. 
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) 
After solving some misspecifications indicated in the model, the results of 
a configural invariance test for Subjective Happiness Scale were rather acceptable, 
with the exception of the factor loading item number 4 in China. Metric invariance 
test, using item number 4 as the reference indicator, indicated that item number 1 
and 2 in Indonesia were not metric invariant. The Subjective Happiness Scale is partial 
metric invariant (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Within group standardized factor loadings of the Subjective Happiness Scale 
 
Scale Items NL US CH IN 
1. In general I consider myself:  
(1) not a happy person – (7) a very happy person 
.87 .93 .78 .76† 
2. Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself:  
(1) less happy – (7) more happy 
.86 .88 .76 1.00† 
3. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless 
of what is going on, getting the most out of everything. To what 
extent does this characterization describe you?  
(1) Not at all – (7) A great deal 
.73 .83 .57 .54 
4. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not 
depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be. To what 
extent does this characterization describe you?  
(1) Not at all – (7) A great deal 
.62 .65 .40 .38 






This section provides supplementary information to the studies presented 
in this chapter. We describe the development of new measurements of the happiness 
norm, happiness pressure, and the pursuit of happiness as a preliminary stage for 
achieving our main research objective, that is to examine the relationships between 
the happiness norm, happiness pressure, the pursuit of happiness, and subjective 
happiness among individualistic and collectivistic countries.  
Study 1: Development of new scales 
The first step of the development of the new scales was items selection 
procedure. We derived the concept of happiness norm, happiness pressure and 
happiness pursuit from published writings on social norms (i.e., Cialdini et al., 1990; 
Kallgren et al., 2000) and the pursuit of happiness (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, et al., 2005; 
Mauss et al., 2011). We defined that a happiness norm is a belief that society 
emphasizes the importance of happiness thus demands people to be happy which 
may elicit pressure. Meanwhile, the pursuit of happiness is defined as the perceived 
importance of happiness and efforts to be happy.  
 We began with a pool of 44 items reflecting perceived social norm and 
pressure to be happy and the pursuit of happiness. Item reductions were done using 
several exclusion criteria. Our intention was to capture the general subjective 
experience of prescriptive norm and pressure to be happy and the extent to which 
people strive for happiness. Therefore, we excluded items covering descriptive and 
personal norms (e.g., “I want to be seen as a happy person”) and items addressing 
very specific efforts of happiness pursuit (e.g., “I practice gratitude to make my life 
happier”). Finally, we omitted items that required a very advanced level of thinking 
as we wanted to reach a general adult population. The item reduction process 
resulted in the first version of the scales, which consisted of 7 items of the happiness 
norm scale, which included items measuring prescriptive norm and norm pressure, 
and 16 items of the pursuit of happiness scale, which included items measuring the 
importance of happiness and the striving for happiness.  
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Methods 
Participants. Ninety-seven American adults were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) – an online marketplace for work – under the restriction 
that they were the United States residents. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 68 
years old (M = 34.40; 66% male).  
Procedure and Measures. Participants completed an online questionnaire 
consisted of the first version of the measures and a validated and widely used 
measure of happiness (i.e., Subjective Happiness Scale, Lyubomirsky & Lepper (1999). 
This is how these new measures correlate with subjective happiness. Participants 
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement of the scales 
using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), and were 
given compensation of 1 USD following their participation.  
Data analysis. To explore the structure and the reliability of the new 
measurements, we conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and a test of 
internal consistency following procedures suggested by Field (2009). The EFA was 
conducted on each measure separately. 
Results 
Happiness Norm Scale (HNS). The analysis of each items of the measures 
showed that 2 items had very low item-total correlations (< .3), indicating that they 
contributed to the relatively low reliability of the scale (α = .59). Therefore, these 
items were excluded and a new reliability test using 5 items of happiness norm scale 
was conducted. This resulted in better internal consistency (α = .73). An EFA using 5 
items of happiness norm scale showed that the scale has 2 factors (eigenvalue > 1), 
namely Factor I: prescriptive norm (2 items) and Factor II: norm pressure (3 items). 
Prescriptive norm items and norm pressure items had adequate internal consistency 
(α = .81 and α = .75, respectively) and were significantly correlated to each other (r 
= .30, p < .01). Moreover, Factor I (prescriptive norm) was positively correlated with 
subjective happiness (r = .26, p < .01) and Factor II (norm pressure) was negatively 
correlated with subjective happiness scale (r = -.23, p < .05). These opposite 
correlations of the two factors with subjective happiness may imply that these factors 
were measuring different concepts, therefore at this phase we decided to separate 




happiness pressure scale. As the number of items for each scale was very low, we 
included additional items measuring the same constructs to the new scales, while 
maintaining the wording similarity with the existing items. This procedure resulted in 
5 items Happiness Norm Scale and 5 items of Happiness Pressure Scale to be used 
in our follow-up study. 
Pursuit of Happiness Scale (PHS). Item analysis showed that all items had 
adequate item-total correlation (> .3), indicating that they were relevant to 
measuring the concept. The internal consistency was high (α = .90). An EFA showed 
that the scale had 4 factors (eigenvalue > 1). At this phase we decided to select items 
based on the following criteria: 1) all items that loaded onto the factor that 
contributed most to explaining the concept, that is Factor I (explaining 42.8% of the 
total variance); and 2) items that had high item-total correlations and conceptually 
represented our definition of the pursuit of happiness. This procedure resulted in 9 
items of the Pursuit of Happiness Scale. Using the new set of 9 items, we conducted 
another reliability test. Results showed that the internal consistency of the new scales 
was high (α = .90) with sufficient item-total correlations in all items (> .3). An EFA 
resulted in single-factor loading which explained 56.3% of the pursuit of happiness. 
Conclusion 
In Study 1 we developed 3 new scales measuring the level of perceived 
social norm to be happy (i.e., 5-items Happiness Norm Scale, HNS), perceived 
pressure to be happy (i.e., 5-items Happiness Pressure Scale, HPS), and the perceived 
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Study 2: The structure, validity and reliability 
of the scales   
To explore the structure, validity and reliability of the final version of the 
new measurements, we conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), a test of 
internal consistency and a concurrent validity test following procedures suggested 
by Field (2009).  
Methods 
Participants. The new scales derived from Study 1 were completed by 254 
university students from the United States, recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) – an online marketplace for work – under the restriction that they were the 
United States residents. Participants age ranged from 18 to 45 years old (M = 24.54; 
38.2% male). 
Procedure and Measures. Participants completed an online questionnaire 
and were given compensation of 1 USD following their participation. The 
questionnaire consisted of 5 items of Happiness Norm Scale, 5 items of Happiness 
Pressure Scale, 9 items of Pursuit of Happiness Scale derived from previous study, 
and 4 items of Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper 1999). To test 
the concurrent validity of the new scales we also included other measures such as 
Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983), Loneliness Scale (Hughes et al., 2004), and 
Rumination Scale (Treynor et al., 2003). 
Results 
Prior to a principal factor analysis (PCA) we tested the sampling adequacy 
and sphericity. The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin measure on each measure verified a good 
sampling adequacy for the analysis (all KMO’s > .79) and all KMO values for individual 
items were > .75, which is well above the acceptable limit of .5 (Field, 2009). Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity indicated that correlations between items on each scale were 
sufficiently large for PCA (i.e. χ2HNS (10) = 646.18, χ2HPS (10) = 778.6, χ2PHS (36) = 





Happiness Norm Scale (HNS). A PCA was conducted to obtain 
eigenvalues for each component in the data. One component had eigenvalues over 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explain 65% of the variance. The scree plot also showed a 
single-factor solution. On the factor derived from PCA, the average factor loading 
was 0.80. Inspection of the item-level statistics indicates that all items loaded 
above .30. Reliability analysis suggests that the scale has an adequate internal 
consistency (α = .86). The HNS is positively correlated with Subjective Happiness 
Scale (r = .14), and negatively correlated with Perceived Stress Scale (r = -.17). 
Happiness Pressure Scale (HPS). The 5 items HPS measures the extent to 
which individuals experience negative feelings or thoughts toward society’s 
emphasis on happiness. One component had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 
and explain 69.16% of the variance with average factor loading of .83. The scree plot 
confirmed this single-factor solution. The item-level statistics indicates that all items 
loaded above .30. Reliability analysis suggests that the scale has an adequate internal 
consistency (α = .88). The HPS is negatively correlated with Subjective Happiness 
Scale (r = -.49), and positively correlated with Loneliness Scale (r = .45), Perceived 
Stress Scale (r = .53), and Rumination Scale (r = 40).  
Pursuit of Happiness Scale (PHS). A PCA showed that 2 components had 
eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and cumulatively explain 59.94% of the 
variance. Inspection of the scree plot reveals a two-factor solution. The first factor 
was loaded with items indicated the efforts to pursue happiness, average factor 
loading was .69. The second factor was loaded with items indicated the importance 
of happiness, average factor loading was .77. The item-level statistics show all items 
loaded above .30. Reliability analysis suggests that the scale has an adequate internal 
consistency (α = .86). The PHS is correlated positively with Subjective Happiness Scale 
(r = .40), and negatively correlated with Loneliness Scale (r = -.22) and Perceived 
Stress Scale (r = -.26). 
Conclusion 
We developed 3 new measurements, namely the Happiness Norm Scale, 
the Happiness Pressure Scale, and the Pursuit of Happiness Scales. These 
measurements are reliable and showed adequate concurrent validity. The final 
versions of the measurements are shown below. 
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The Happiness Norm Scale 
 
Instruction:  
“For the next several questions, please indicate your level of agreement with each 
statement by selecting the number on the rating scale that best describes the way 
you think or feel about your social environment.”  
 
Items: 
1. I think there is a norm in society that people should strive for happiness. 
2. I think that people in my social environment believe that everybody should try 
to be happy. 
3. The norm in today’s society is to be as happy as possible  
4. Society encourages people to strive for happiness 
5. It is as if the norm in society is that people ought to be happy 
 
Responses:  





The Happiness Pressure Scale 
 
Instruction:  
“For the next several questions, please indicate your level of agreement with each 
statement by selecting the number on the rating scale that best describes your 
experience about being happy.” 
 
Items: 
1. I feel society’s pressure to be happy. 
2. Current society’s emphasis on happiness makes me insecure.  
3. The idea that everybody should be happy bothers me.  
4. I experience today's norm to be happy as a burden. 
5. I am sometimes annoyed by current society's emphasis on happiness. 
 
Responses:  
The response scale is ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
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The Pursuit of Happiness Scale 
 
Instruction:  
“The next several questions have to do with your happiness. For these questions, 
please indicate your level of agreement with each statement by selecting the number 
on the rating scale that best describes what you generally think and do.”  
 
Items: 
1. Feeling happy is extremely important to me  
2. To have a meaningful life, I need to feel happy most of the time.  
3. I rarely think about my happiness. (-)  
4. I spend most of my time trying to be happy. 
5. I often engage in activities that I believe will help me to feel happier.  
6. Most of the time, I stay away from situations that make me feel unhappy.  
7. I make strong efforts to feel happier than I am now.  
8. I rarely attempt to make my life happier. (-) 
9. I think there is no use of trying to feel good all the time. (-) 
 
Responses:  
The response scale is ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
Note: Item number 3, 8 and 9 are reverse scored items 
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Abstract 
The present research examined whether happy people are liked more and 
envied more than unhappy people, and whether this effect is moderated by the 
happiness level of the perceiver. Specifically, we tested whether people generally like 
happy people more than unhappy people, or whether people like others more when 
they are similar in happiness level (as the similarity hypothesis would predict). In 
three studies, we assessed participants’ own happiness level, and asked them to 
evaluate a target person in terms of liking and envy, based on a person-description 
that was experimentally varied in the level of happiness. Results showed that happy 
people were liked and envied more than unhappy people, and this effect was not 
moderated by participants’ own happiness level, showing no evidence for the 
similarity effect. Importantly, it was particularly unhappiness that was evaluated 
negatively, and additional findings demonstrated that fear of emotional contagion 
was driving this effect. These findings are discussed in terms of the important role of 
perceived happiness in person-judgment. 
 






People are naturally motivated to pursue happiness (K. H. Howell et al., 
2016), in part because happiness is associated with many advantages in various life 
domains, including greater physical health, satisfying social relationships, superior 
work outcomes, and more energy and flow (see Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 
2005 for a review). Moreover, research shows that happy individuals tend to be more 
positively appraised by others, for example, people believe that a happy person is 
physically more attractive (Diener et al., 1995; Mathes & Kahn, 1975), intelligent, 
competent, more socially skilled (Diener & Fujita, 1995), as well as more friendly, 
warm, and assertive (Schimmack et al., 2004). Previous research also demonstrated 
that people who smile and laugh (i.e., expressions of happiness, at least for the 
moment) are evaluated more positively than people who do not (e.g., Lau, 1982; 
Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2007; Reysen, 2006). Similarly, social interactions with happy 
as compared to unhappy people run more smoothly and induce more positive affect 
in interaction partners (cf. Coyne 1976a; 1976b).  
Although another person’s happiness is associated with various positive 
outcomes, it is not clear whether people actually like happy others more than 
unhappy others. This intuitive prediction has not been tested directly. Importantly, 
although this prediction may seem straightforward at first glance, the link between 
happiness and liking may be more complicated when considering previous research 
on the role of similarity on liking. Similarity principles suggest that people tend to 
like similar others (Byrne 1961; Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner 2008). This similarity 
effect has been found in many domains, indicating that we tend to prefer and like 
others who are similar to us with regard to our own attitudes (e.g., Byrne, Bond, & 
Diamond, 1969; Singh et al., 2017), personality characteristics (e.g., Byrne, Griffitt, & 
Stefaniak, 1967; Park & Lennon, 2008), socio-economic background (e.g., Byrne, 
Clore, & Worchel, 1966), physical attractiveness (e.g., Stevens, Owens, & Schaefer, 
1990; van Straaten, Engels, Finkenauer, & Holland, 2009), preference for activities, 
music, religion, ethical views (e.g., Launay & Dunbar, 2015; Werner & Parmelee, 1979), 
and so on.  
Does the similarity principle also apply to happiness? Is it the case that 
happy people like happy others more than unhappy others, whereas unhappy people 
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like unhappy others more than happy others? In the current research, we examined 
these two possible alternative hypotheses: People like happy others more than 
unhappy others, irrespective of one’s own level of happiness (i.e., Hypothesis 1: 
happiness-leads-to-liking), or alternatively, the effect of happiness on liking is 
moderated by one’s own level of happiness, such that happy people like happy 
others more than unhappy others, whereas unhappy people like unhappy others 
more than happy others (i.e., Hypothesis 1alt: own-happiness-moderation).  
In addition to more liking, people may be more envious towards happy 
versus unhappy others. Envy stems from a process of upward social comparison. It 
arises when “a person lacks another’s superior quality, achievement, or possession, 
and either desires it or wishes that the other lacked it” (Parrott & Smith, 1993, p. 906). 
It can be reduced by narrowing the gap between oneself and the other. As proposed 
by Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters (2009),  there are two types of envy: benign 
and malicious envy. Benign envy is experienced when people like and admire 
someone, want to be closer to this person, and want to improve their own position 
by moving up. Malicious envy, on the other hand, is experienced when people feel 
frustrated by the superiority of someone, think that the other does not deserve it, 
are more willing to do harm, and hope that the other would fail. In the current 
research, we focus on benign envy, and predicted that people would experience 
benign envy toward happier others. If people indeed are naturally motivated to 
pursue happiness (K. H. Howell et al., 2016), instead of wanting a more happy person 
to be unhappy (i.e. malicious envy), they should ‘want to be like’ the other person 
who is more happy than themselves (i.e. benign envy). While the effect of perceived 
happiness on liking may or may not be independent of one’s own level of happiness, 
as proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 1alt, we suggest that the effect of perceived 
happiness on envy should depend on one’s own happiness, given that envy by 
definition results from a process of social comparison. Hence, we hypothesized that 
unhappy people should envy happy others more as compared to people who are 
happy themselves (Hypothesis 2).  
In sum, the present research examines the effect of a target person’s 
happiness on liking for the target irrespective of people’s own level of happiness 
(Hypothesis 1), and alternatively, as moderated by people’s own level of happiness 
(Hypothesis 1alt). In addition, we examine whether a happy versus an unhappy target 




themselves (Hypothesis 2). In three studies, we assessed people's own level of 
happiness and then asked them to evaluate a person in terms of liking and envy, 
based on a person-description implying that the person is either happy or unhappy 
(or a control target about whom no information about happiness was given in Study 
1).  
In addition to testing our central predictions, the current research addresses 
a few additional issues. First, while some previous research findings suggest that 
people tend to respond positively to happy people (e.g., towards a smiling person, 
Lau, 1982, and a laughing person, Reysen, 2006) the detrimental effects of 
unhappiness on interpersonal liking may stand out more strongly. For example, 
previous research showed that depressed people tend to be disliked (e.g., Vernberg, 
1990; Zimmer-Gembeck, Waters, & Kindermann, 2010), and based on the general 
notion that “bad-is-stronger-than-good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001), the effects of unhappiness on disliking may be stronger than the effects 
of happiness on liking. We address this issue in Study 1.  
Second, we aimed to test the robustness of our hypothesized ‘happy people 
are liked-effect’ (or, for short, the happiness-liking effect) and to see whether 
happiness versus unhappiness in a target would affect liking even when crossed with 
other characteristics that have been found to affect interpersonal liking. For instance, 
previous studies found that disabled people are often evaluated negatively by others, 
and encounters with them evoke negative emotions (e.g., Livneh, 1982; Vilchinsky, 
Findler, & Werner, 2010). People would generally envy and perhaps like a disabled 
person less than a non-disabled person. Similarly, previous research has indicated 
that people strive for wealth (e.g., Argyle, 2001; Weimann, Knabe, & Schob, 2015), 
and generally tend to like and envy the rich more than the poor (e.g., Fiske, 2010; 
Horwitz & Dovidio, 2017). An interesting question is whether the level of happiness 
of a disabled or non-disabled, and of a rich or poor person, would override any 
possible effects of physical health and wealth on liking and envy. Specifically, do 
people like and envy a happy person more than an unhappy person, irrespective of 
whether the person is non-disabled or disabled (which we test in Study 2), and 
irrespective of whether the person is wealthy or poor (which we test in Study 3)? 
Testing these predictions would give further insight into the potentially powerful 
effects of happiness versus unhappiness on interpersonal liking and envy. 
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Finally, in Studies 2 and 3, we attempted to gain a better understanding of 
why happiness affects liking, thereby focusing on two possible mechanisms. As we 
will explain in more detail in the introduction to Study 2, people who have a strong 
sense that the world is a just place where people get what they deserve (i.e., Belief in 
a Just World, BJW; Lerner, 1980) may be especially prone to the happiness-liking 
effect as they may think that happy people are happy because they are good (and 
thus likable), and unhappy people are unhappy because they are bad (and thus 
dislikeable). In Study 3, we tested another potential mechanism, namely that people 
like happy others and conversely dislike unhappy others because (un)happiness may 
be perceived as contagious (cf. Coyne, 1976a). People may want to be influenced by 
others’ happiness but do not want to be contaminated with another person’s 
unhappiness, and thus, they may dislike unhappy others more than happy others. 
Furthermore, this effect of perceived happiness on the so-called fear of emotional 
contagion may be stronger in people high (versus low) in their tendency to mirror 
others’ emotion (i.e., emotional contagion susceptibility). After all, and we will explain 
this in more detail below, only a person who takes over the emotions of others 
relatively easily (i.e. someone high in emotional contagion susceptibility; cf. Hsee et 
al., 1990) should fear that another person’s unhappiness may infect him or her.  
Study 1 
In Study 1 we hypothesized that happy people are evaluated more 
positively by others than unhappy people (Hypothesis 1). Happiness is highly valued 
not only in one's own life but also in the life of other people (Veenhoven, 2009), and 
this may be independent of one’s own happiness. Alternatively, it is also possible that 
the evaluation of others depends on similarity principles (i.e., people’s tendency to 
like similar others). If this is true, happy people should evaluate happy others more 
positively than unhappy others, and unhappy people should evaluate unhappy 
others more positively than happy others (Hypothesis 1alt). In addition, we predicted 
that happy people evoke more envy than unhappy people, particularly among others 







One hundred and fifteen US citizens (57% male, age ranged 19 – 67 years 
old, M = 35.49, SD = 10.74) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants’ 
self-reported ethnic background was 78% White, 10% Asian, 7% African American, 
3% Hispanic, and 2% mixed. Participants reported a range of educational 
backgrounds: 47% had a bachelor degree, 15% an associate degree, 15% a master’s 
degree, 13% completed high school, 4% a doctoral degree, 4% a certificate or 
diploma, 1% an advanced degree, and 1% did not complete high school. Participants’ 
self-reported work life was 55% full-time employee, 10% part-time employee, 10% 
self-employed, 9% unemployed, 7% student, and 9% either retired, homemaker or 
other.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked to participate in a two-part online study. The first 
and the second part were given 2 to 10 days apart. The first part of the study 
consisted of several measures and demographic questions. The primary experimental 
task was administered during the second part of the study. Participants received $0.5 
upon completion of each part adding up to $1 in total. A general description of what 
was expected from participants was posted on www.mturk.com. Informed consent 
was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. After providing 
informed consent, participants received the link to the first part of the study. 
In the first part, participants were asked to complete a set of questionnaires 
including the Subjective Happiness Scale to examine individual differences in 
perceived own happiness (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). At the end of the 
questionnaire, they were asked to provide demographic information (i.e., age, sex, 
ethnicity, work life, and educational background). In the second part, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In each condition, they were 
asked to read a brief description of a target person called Bob. The target’s happiness 
was systematically varied (i.e., a happy Bob, an unhappy Bob, and a neutral Bob; see 
Supplementary Materials for the target’s descriptions). Following this, participants 
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were asked to evaluate the target person on likeability and perceived envy for the 
target. Finally, as a manipulation check, they were also asked to rate the target 
person's happiness level. 
Materials 
The Subjective Happiness Scale is “a global, subjective assessment of 
whether one is a happy or an unhappy person” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 139). 
The scale consists of four items. Instructions require participants to indicate the way 
they perceive their level of happiness on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., “In general I 
consider myself (1) not a happy person to (7) a very happy person”; Cronbach’s α 
= .88). For exploratory reasons, we included other individual differences measures: 
the Trait Depression Scale (Spielberger, 1995 as cited in Krohne, Schmukle, Spaderna, 
& Spielberger, 2002), the Happiness Norm Scale, the Happiness Pressure Scales, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness Scale (Kumalasari et al., under review). For the sake of 
brevity and the goals of the current paper, we will not further report on these 
additional measures. To be sure, none of these measures moderated any effects we 
report below.  
We measured the target’s likeability using four items of the 11-items 
Reysen Likeability Scale which represent liking (Reysen, 2005; e.g., “Bob is friendly”, 
“Bob is likeable”). Responses for each item was on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s α = .96). Benign envy was measured with 
participants’ level of agreement with two items (i.e., “I would like to live like Bob”, 
and “Bob is one of those people that I would like to trade places with”) on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s α = .83). These 








The manipulation check revealed that the target descriptions were effective 
in affecting the target’s perceived level of happiness, F(2, 112) = 71.37, p < .001, ηp2 
= .56. Participants rated the happy target (M = 5.54, SD = 1.09) as happier than the 
neutral target, M = 4.93, SD = 0.97, t(112) = 2.47, p = .02, and the neutral target as 
happier than the unhappy target, M = 2.68, SD = 1.21, t(112) = 9.04, p < .001.  
Target’s happiness, participants’ happiness, and target’s 
likeability. 
To test the prediction (Hypothesis 1) that the target’s happiness levels 
would affect likability, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with the target’s happiness 
levels (i.e., happy, neutral, and unhappy) as the independent variable, and likability 
as the dependent variable. The analysis revealed a significant effect of the target’s 
happiness levels on likability, F(2, 112) = 40.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. As predicted, the 
happy target, M = 5.52, SD = 0.82, was rated as more likeable than the neutral target, 
M = 4.96, SD = 0.81, t(112) = 2.80, p = .006, d = 0.69, and the unhappy target, M = 
3.74, SD = 1.00, t(112) = 8.82, p < .001, d = 1.95. The neutral target was rated as more 
likable than the unhappy target, t(112) = 6.17, p < .001, d = 1.34.  
We hypothesized that the pattern of differences between target’s happiness 
levels in likability may depend on participants’ subjective happiness (i.e., Hypothesis 
1alt). To test this prediction, we conducted a moderated multiple regression using 
Model 1 PROCESS macro (v3.4; Hayes, 2018) on SPSS. The analysis tests the effects 
of the focal independent variable target’s happiness (X) and the moderator variable 
participants’ happiness (M), and the effect of two-way interactions of participants’ 
happiness by target’s happiness (XM) on likability. The continuous predictor 
participants’ happiness was centered prior to analysis (M`). The categorical predictor 
target’s happiness was coded using the Helmert coding that generated regression 
coefficients estimating: 1) the mean difference in likability between the unhappy 
 
1 The raw data of the studies reported in this manuscript are available at a public repository the Open 
Science Framework (https://osf.io/92z3h/?view_only=d2056037373a46a281ad206f287e3d59). 
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target and the unweighted 2  mean of neutral and happy target (X1), and 2) the 
difference in likability between the means of neutral target and happy target (X2) 
(Hayes & Montoya, 2017). The interaction terms were computed by multiplying each 
code of target’s happiness levels with centered participants’ happiness (X1M` and 
X2M`).  
The analysis revealed that the predicted interaction between participants’ 
happiness and target’s happiness on likability was not significant, R2-change = .01, 
F(2, 109) = 0.35, p = .71. The mean likability of unhappy target as compared to the 
mean likability of neutral and happy target was not significantly differ as a function 
of participants’ level of subjective happiness, BX1M` = 0.18, 95% CI = [-0.26, 0.61]. 
Similarly, the difference between mean likability of the neutral target and happy 
target did not depend on participants’ level of subjective happiness, BX2M` = -0.05, 
95% CI = [-0.43, 0.33]. Contrary to the similarity hypothesis, the effect of target’s 
happiness levels on likability was not moderated by participants’ own level of 
subjective happiness.  
Target’s happiness, participants’ happiness, and envy 
toward the target. 
Another one-way ANOVA was conducted with envy as the dependent 
variable. Results show that the target’s happiness had a significant effect on envy, 
F(2, 112) = 17.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. The happy target evoked more envy, M = 4.01, 
SD = 1.21, than the unhappy target, M = 2.44, SD = 1.19, t(112) = 5.51, p < .001, d = 
1.31, and the unhappy target evoked less envy than the neutral target, M = 3.73, SD 
= 1.29, t(112) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 1.04. However, the happy versus the neutral target 
were not significantly different, t(111) = .97, p = .33, d = 0.22.  
The analysis to test the two-way interactions of participants’ happiness by 
target’s happiness on envy (i.e., Hypothesis 2) was similar to the one in the previous 
section. Not supporting Hypothesis 2, the analysis revealed a non-significant two-
way interaction of participants’ happiness by target’s happiness on envy, R2-change 
= .03, F(2, 109) = 1.58, p = .21. The mean envy of unhappy target as compared to the 
 
2 The target’s happiness groups had unequal sample sizes (nhappy = 37, nunhappy = 38, nneutral = 40). 
Applying Helmert codes allow means to be combined but unweighted, so that the differences in group 




mean envy of neutral and happy target was did not significantly differ as a function 
of participants’ level of subjective happiness, B = 0.45, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.95]. Again, 
the difference between mean envy of neutral target and happy target did not depend 
on participants’ level of subjective happiness, B = -0.14, 95% CI = [-0.80, 0.53]. Thus, 
we found no support for the hypothesis that envy toward different levels of others’ 
happiness depended on one’s own level of happiness. Instead, irrespective of one’s 
own level of happiness, participants were significantly more envious towards happy 
as compared to unhappy targets. Finally, a Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between envy and liking toward 
the target, and revealed a significant correlation between the two variables, r(113) = 
0.59, p < .001.  
In sum, the findings of Study 1 provide strong support for the hypothesis 
that people show more liking and envy for a happy person than for a neutral and an 
unhappy person. An unhappy person was liked less and envied less as compared to 
a neutral person. In fact, the effect size when comparing unhappy versus neutral was 
twice as a large as the effect size when comparing happy versus neutral (we return 
to this issue in the General Discussion). Importantly, and contrary to the similarity 
hypothesis, these strong effects of target’s happiness occurred irrespective of 
people’s own happiness level. Thus, similarity in happiness does not seem to lead to 
more, or less, liking. Moreover, happiness does induce envy, but not more so for 
people relatively low versus high in happiness, as we had hypothesized. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we explored whether the effects of a target person’s happiness 
on liking and envy is influenced by the target person's physical health. In Study 1 we 
found that the effects of a person’s happiness on liking and envy for the person were 
strong (ηp2’s > .14), and we wanted to investigate whether these strong effects of 
happiness can override the effects of physical health. Specifically, we examined 
whether people would still like and envy a happy person more than an unhappy 
person irrespective of the person’s physical health (i.e., non-disabled or disabled). 
Previous studies have shown that people tend to evaluate physically healthy people 
more positively than unhealthy people (Chan et al., 2009). Therefore, we added a 
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physical health condition to the target person’s description, so that the target was 
described as either non-disabled and happy, non-disabled and unhappy, disabled 
and happy, or disabled and unhappy.  
In this study, we also aimed to better understand why happiness affects 
liking, and conversely, why unhappiness affects disliking. As Just World Theory 
(Lerner, 1980) suggests, people tend to believe that the world is a just place, that 
people get what they deserve, and that bad things happen to bad people and good 
things to good people. People who have a strong belief in a just world may think 
that happy people deserve to be happy because they are good and thus likable, and 
unhappy people deserve to be unhappy because they are bad and thus dislikeable. 
We, therefore, reasoned that the effect of a person’s happiness on liking for the 
person should be particularly strong for people high (versus low) in belief in a just 
world (i.e., Hypothesis 3: moderation-by-belief in a just world).  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy-seven US citizens (54% male, age ranged 18 – 76 
years old, M = 34.86, SD = 12.56) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in the 
study. Participants’ self-reported ethnic background was 75% White, 13% Asian, 6% 
Hispanic, 4% African American, and 2% mixed. They reported a range of educational 
backgrounds: 48% had a bachelor degree, 24% completed high school, 18% an 
associate degree, 3% a master’s degree, 3% a certificate or diploma, 2% an advanced 
degree, 1% a doctoral degree, and 1% did not complete high school. Participants’ 
self-reported work life was 46% full-time employee, 13% self-employed, 12% part-
time employee, 10% unemployed, 7% student, 5% homemaker, 3% retired, and 4% 
other.  
Procedures and Materials 
As in the previous study, we conducted Study 2 in two parts. In the first part, 
along with the other measurements (including the Subjective Happiness Scale as 




in a Just World Scale (BJW; Lucas, Zhdanova, & Alexander, 2011), e.g., “People usually 
receive the outcomes that they deserve”) that measures their belief in a just world 
using 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s α 
= .96). In the second part, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
target person conditions of a 2 happiness (happy vs. unhappy) x 2 physical health 
(non-disabled vs. disabled) factorial design (see Supplementary Materials for the 
detailed target’s descriptions). Following this, participants were asked to evaluate the 
target based on Likability (Cronbach’s α = .97) and Envy (Cronbach’s α = .84). As a 
manipulation check, participants were also asked to rate the target's happiness (i.e., 
“How happy do you think Bob is in general?”)3.  
Results 
The manipulation check showed that participants assigned a significantly 
higher happiness level to the happy target, M = 5.56, SD = 1.02, than to the unhappy 
target, M = 2.93, SD = 1.06; F(1, 173) = 290.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, indicating that the 
target descriptions were successful in differentiating the happy from the unhappy 
target.  
Target’s happiness, target’s physical health, participants’ 
happiness, and target’s likeability 
To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a moderated multiple regression using 
Model 1 PROCESS macro (v3.4; Hayes, 2018) on SPSS. This model tests the effect of 
focal independent variable target’s happiness (X) and the moderator variable target’s 
physical health (M) on the dependent variable target’s likability. The dichotomous 
target’s happiness and target’s health were coded 0 (i.e., unhappy target, disabled 
target) and 1 (i.e., happy target, non-disabled target) prior to analysis. Results 
showed a significant effect of target’s happiness, B = 1.37, 95% CI = [0.97, 1.78], a 
non-significant effects of target’s physical health, B = -0.12, 95% CI = [-0.56, 0.32], 
 
3 For exploratory reasons we also measured target’s deservedness using 2 items, namely “To what 
extent do you think Bob is responsible for his own happiness?” and “To what extent do you think Bob 
is able to determine his own happiness?” (Cronbach’s α = .95). However, there are no significant 
effects of target’s happiness and physical health on deservedness. For the sake of brevity, we do not 
report the results in the paper. 
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and a non-significant interaction, B = 0.39, 95% CI = [-0.17, 0.96], on likability. These 
outcomes support the results of Study 1 that participants liked the happy target, M 
= 5.52, SD = 0.83, more than the unhappy target, M = 3.95, SD = 1.04. These effects 
occurred irrespective of the physical health of the target. We did not replicate 
previous research findings that have suggested that people tend to like physically 
healthy persons more than physically unhealthy persons (e.g., Chan et al., 2009).  
We examined Hypothesis 1alt by conducting a moderated moderation 
analysis using Model 3 PROCESS macro. This model tests the first order effects of 
target’s happiness (X), target’s health (M), and participants’ happiness (W), the lower 
order interactions (XM, XW, and MW), and the higher order interaction (XMW). The 
continuous predictor participants’ level of subjective happiness (W) was mean 
centered prior to analyses. The two-way and three-way interactions, if attainable, 
were probed by employing the pick-a-point approach to the continuous variable 
participants’ happiness (Hayes, 2013). This procedure allows us to test the effect of 
target’s happiness and target’s health on likability at different levels of participants’ 
happiness. We used one standard deviation below the mean, the mean and one 
standard deviation above the mean to represent “low”, “moderate”, and “high” levels 
of participants’ level of subjective happiness, respectively. Moreover, the regression 
models were estimated using HC3 estimators that does not assume 
homoscedasticity (see Hayes & Cai, 2007 for review) to improve the validity and 
power of the tests (this method was used in all three-way interaction in Model 3 
PROCESS macro throughout this research). 
Results show that the three-way interaction between target’s happiness, 
target’s physical health and participants’ happiness on target’s likability was not 
significant, B = 0.05, 95% CI = [-0.32, 0.43]. There were also no significant two-way 
interactions between the target’s happiness and health, B = 0.33, 95% CI = [-0.23, 
0.90], and between the target’s health and participants’ happiness, B = -0.03, 95% CI 
= [-0.19, 0.18], on target’s likability.  
We found, however, a marginally significant two-way interaction between 
target’s happiness and participants’ level of subjective happiness, B = 0.19, 95% CI = 
[0.00, 0.38]. Further analysis of this two-way interaction using Model 1 PROCESS 
macro revealed that the effect of target’s happiness on likability was significantly 




rather than at the lower level of participants’ happiness, B = 1.29, 95% CI = [.96, 1.63]. 
Looking at the interaction differently, the effect of participants’ happiness on 
likability was only significant within the happy target, B = 0.15, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.25], 
but not within the unhappy target, B = -0.05, 95% CI = [-0.20, 0.09]. There was no 
evidence of significant first order effects of target’s health, B = -0.14, 95% CI = [-0.57, 
0.29], and participants’ happiness, B = -0.04, 95% CI = [-0.22, 0.14]. However, 
consistent with Study 1 findings the analysis revealed a significant effect of target’s 
happiness on likability, B = 1.42, 95% CI = [1.012, 1.83].  
In sum, Study 2 confirmed Hypothesis 1 and the findings of Study 1 that 
people like a happy person more than an unhappy person. This effect occurred 
regardless of the conditions of the person’s physical health. We did find that the 
happier the participants, the more they like a happy person as compared to an 
unhappy person, providing initial support for Hypothesis 1alt (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Target’s likability as function of target’s happiness levels, target’s physical health, 
and participants’ levels of happiness 
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Target’s happiness, target’s physical health, participants’ 
happiness and envy toward the target 
Similar to the previous analysis, we conducted a moderated multiple 
regression to test the effect of focal independent variable target’s happiness (X) and 
the moderator variable target’s physical health (M) on the dependent variable envy 
toward the target. Results showed a significant effect of target’s physical health, B = 
0.77, 95% CI = [0.24, 1.31] and a non-significant effect of target’s happiness, B = 0.39, 
95% CI = [-0.13, 0.91] on envy. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
between both variables, B = 1.00, 95% CI = [0.22, 1.79]. Interestingly, although there 
was no evidence for the first order effect of target’s happiness on envy, the effect of 
happiness on envy was significant within the non-disabled target, B = 1.40, 95% CI = 
[0.81, 1.89], but not within the disabled target, B = 0.39, 95% CI = [-0.13, 0.91]. The 
happy non-disabled target was envied more than unhappy non-disabled target, 
while both the happy and unhappy disabled targets were relatively less envied. 
Indeed, the non-disabled target (regardless of whether he was happy or unhappy) 
was envied more than his disabled counterpart, even more so when he was happy 
(as compared to unhappy). This effect was shown in the significant effect of the 
target’s physical health within both the happy target, B = 1.78, 95% CI = [1.21, 2.35], 
and the unhappy target, B = 0.77, 95% CI = [0.24, 1.31].  
To test the effect of participants’ happiness on the relationship between 
target’s happiness and target’s health on envy, a moderated moderation analysis was 
conducted using Model 3 PROCESS macro (v3.4). Results did not reveal a three-way 
interaction between target’s happiness, target’s physical health, and participants’ 
happiness on envy, B = 0.10, 95% CI = [-0.37, 0.57]. There was no evidence of two-
way interactions between target’s happiness and participants’ happiness on envy, B 
= 0.10, 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.43]. However, similar to previous analysis, we found a two-
way interaction between target’s happiness and target’s physical health, B = 0.97, 95% 
CI = [0.18, 1.76]. The results of a two-way interaction analysis to examine the 
conditional effect of each variable on envy have been explained in the previous 
paragraph. 
We also found a two-way interaction between participants’ happiness and 
the target’s physical health, B = -0.41, 95% CI = [-0.72, -0.10]. Further analysis to 




disabled target, and this effect was significantly stronger among participants 
relatively low in happiness, B = 1.76, 95% CI = [1.27, 2.26], than among participants 
relatively high in happiness, B = 0.78, 95% CI = [0.18, 1.39]. Moreover, the effect of 
participants’ happiness was only significant within the non-disabled target, B = -0.32, 
95% CI = [-0.51, -0.13], but not within the disabled target, B = -0.003, 95% CI = [-
0.16, 0.15]. Participants with relatively low happiness, as compared to participants 
with relatively high happiness, were more envious toward the non-disabled target. 
However, they indicated similar and relatively low envy toward the disabled target 
regardless of their happiness level. Similar to Study 1, envy and liking toward the 
target is positively correlated, r(172) = 0.44, p < .001.  
 
 
Figure 2. Envy toward the target as a function of the target’s happiness levels, the target’s 
physical health, and participants’ levels of happiness 
 
 
In sum, Study 2 demonstrated that the effect of target’s happiness on envy 
was only significant within the non-disabled target, but not within the disabled target. 
That is, a happy person is envied more than an unhappy person, only if he is non-
disabled. A disabled person, on the other hand, is less envied than the non-disabled 
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person, regardless of whether he is happy or unhappy. Thus, these findings partially 
support our Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants’ level 
of subjective happiness did not moderate the relationship between target’s 
happiness and target’s physical health on envy. However, the findings showed that 
relatively unhappy participants, as compared to relatively happy participants, are 
more envious toward a non-disabled person, while this difference between happy 
and unhappy participants in envy was not found for a disabled target person (see 
Figure 2).  
A moderation-by-Belief in a Just World hypothesis 
To test whether participants’ belief in a just world moderates the effect of 
target’s happiness and target’s physical health on liking and envy, we conducted a 
moderated moderation analysis using Model 3 PROCESS macro similar to the 
previous analysis. No significant three-way interaction between target’s happiness, 
target’s physical health, and participants’ belief in a just world on liking, B = -0.36, 
95% CI = [-0.84, 0.12] as well as on envy, B = -0.13, 95% CI = [-0.73, 0.47]. These 
findings indicate that participants’ evaluations toward a target person’s happiness 
and physical health were not affected by their level of belief in a just world.  
In sum, the findings from Study 2 support Hypothesis 1 and previous 
findings that people like a happy person better than an unhappy person. The effect 
of happiness on a person’s likability is independent of the person’s physical health. 
We partly found support for the own-happiness-moderation hypothesis, that is, a 
happy target was liked more to the extent that participants were happier themselves, 
and an unhappy target was liked more to the extent that participants were less happy. 
Results also show that people envy a happy person more than an unhappy person, 
if the person is non-disabled. It seems that a person’s physical health evokes more 
envy, especially in unhappy people. Unhappier people (as compared to happier 
people) are relatively more envious toward a non-disabled person, while people, in 
general, are less envious toward a disabled person. The findings also support 
previous findings that there is a positive association between benign envy and liking 
toward others (e.g., van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009; Study 1, current 
research). Finally, we found that belief in a just world did not moderate the effect of 





Several research findings have shown that someone’s wealth affects their 
evaluation by others. For example, people favor the rich over the middle class 
(Horwitz & Dovidio, 2017), distance themselves from the poor (Lott, 2002), envy the 
rich and scorn the poor (Fiske, 2010). In Study 3 we aimed to compare the effect of 
wealth with the effect of happiness on liking. Therefore, we extended our research 
with different wealth conditions (i.e., rich vs. poor) and added wealth to the target’s 
descriptions so that the target was described as rich and happy, rich and unhappy, 
poor and happy, or poor and unhappy. We examined whether the effect of the 
target’s happiness on liking and envy holds even when crossed with the target’s 
wealth. Similar to the previous studies, we examined Hypothesis 1 (i.e., happiness-
leads-to-liking), Hypothesis 1alt (i.e., own-happiness-moderation for liking), and 
Hypothesis 2 (i.e., own-happiness-moderation for envy). 
Study 2 indicated that the moderation-by-Belief in a Just World hypothesis 
was unsuccessful to explain why people like happy others and dislike unhappy others. 
In Study 3, we explored another potential explanation, namely perceived emotional 
contagion susceptibility. Emotions appear to be contagious from person to person 
through facial expressions, vocalization, and posture. Individual differences in the 
tendency to automatically synchronize with the expressions of others influence the 
extent to which people are affected by the emotional expression of others (Hatfield 
et al., 1993). People who are more susceptible to mirror other’s emotion would react 
differently from those who are less susceptible when encountering a happy or an 
unhappy person. For example, an encounter with an unhappy person may evoke 
more fear of being affected by the person’s unhappiness, especially in people who 
are more susceptible to emotional contagion (i.e., score higher on an emotional 
contagion susceptibility scale). That is, an individual scoring high on emotional 
contagion susceptibility may particularly dislike an unhappy person because he or 
she is especially likely to fear emotion contagion by the unhappy person. To examine 
this prediction, we measured the extent to which participants worry to be affected 
by the happy and unhappy target (i.e., fear of emotional contagion toward the target) 
after they read the target description. In addition, in the first phase of the study, thus 
before participants read the target descriptions, participants’ general inclination to 
mirror other’s emotion (i.e., participants’ emotional contagion susceptibility) was 
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measured. We then tested the indirect effect of target’s happiness on liking through 
fear of emotional contagion, and tested whether this indirect effect depended on the 
participant’s dispositional emotional contagion susceptibility (i.e., a moderated-




Participants were 214 United States citizens (47% male, age range from 21 
- 72 years old, M = 37.15, SD = 10.83) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Participants’ self-reported ethnic background was 88% White, 5% Asian, 5% African 
American, 1% Hispanic, and 1% mixed. They reported a range of educational 
backgrounds: 38% had a bachelor degree, 24% completed high school, 13.5% an 
associate degree, 11% a master’s degree, 9% a certificate or diploma, 2% an 
advanced degree, 2% a doctoral degree, and 0.5% did not complete high school. 
Participants’ self-reported work life was 65% full-time employee, 9% self-employed, 
9% homemaker, 8% part-time employee, 4% unemployed, 2% student, 2% retired, 
and 1% other.  
Procedures and Materials 
 The procedures and materials of Study 3 were similar to the previous 
studies, except for the target’s descriptions and some additional measures. In 
addition to the scales that were used in the previous studies, participants were asked 
to complete six items of the 15-items Emotional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997), 
which measures the imitative tendency to happiness and sadness using 4-point Likert 
scale (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = often, 4 = always; i.e., “Being around happy people 
fills my heart with happy thoughts”; “I cry at sad movies”; Cronbach’s α = .79). Two 
to 10 days later, participants were randomly assigned to read a brief description of a 
target person called Bob, depending on their conditions. The target’s happiness and 
wealth were systematically varied (i.e., a happy-rich target, a happy-poor target, an 
unhappy-rich target, and an unhappy-poor target; see Supplementary Materials for 




based on the target’s likability, envy for the target, and an additional 3 questions on 
fear of emotional contagion (i.e., “I would avoid Bob to protect myself from 
becoming unhappy”; Cronbach’s α = .84) 4 . Finally, the manipulation check was 
presented to the participants. The internal consistencies for the other previously used 
scales (i.e., subjective happiness, likability, and envy) remained high (Cronbach’s α 
ranged from .92 to .95).  
Results 
Similar to the previous studies, an analysis for the manipulation check 
question indicated that participants were able to differentiate the happy target, M = 
5.60, SD = 1, from the unhappy one, M = 2.87, SD = 1.15, F(1, 210) = 348.27, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .62. 
Target’s happiness levels, target’s wealth, participants’ 
happiness levels, and target’s likeability  
Model 1 PROCESS macro (v3.4; Hayes, 2018) on SPSS was used to test the 
interaction between target’s happiness and target’s wealth on likability. The analysis 
revealed significant conditional effects of target’s happiness, B = 0.95, 95% CI = [0.62, 
1.28], and wealth, B = -0.65, 95% CI = [-1.05, -0.26], on likability5. The happy target, 
M = 5.51, SD = 0.75, was liked significantly more than the unhappy target, M = 4.27, 
SD = 1.09, and the rich target, M = 4.67, SD = 1.23, was liked less than the poor target, 
M = 5.07, SD = 0.98. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between 
both variables, B = 0.59, 95% CI = [0.92, 1.08]. Inspection of the conditional effects 
shows a significantly stronger effect of target’s happiness within the rich target, B = 
 
4 Similar to Study 2, we measured target’s deservedness but did not find any significant effects of 
targets’ happiness and wealth on deservedness. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the results in 
the paper.   
5 The test of homogeneity of variances and homoscedasticity indicated that the error variance of 
likability scores is unequal across conditions. We did a Log10 transformation on the raw data, which 
then made the error variance of likability scores more homogenous and homoscedastic. We used the 
transformed data to conduct a factorial ANOVA for target’s happiness and target’s wealth on 
likability. The group means resulting from the analysis were back-transformed for interpretation. 
Results show that although the values of the back-transformed means are slightly higher than the 
original means, the mean differences among conditions are significant, in line with the results of the 
factorial ANOVA of the raw data. We decided to report the results of the raw data analysis in the 
current paper and include the results of the transformed data analysis in Supplementary Materials. 
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1.53, 95% CI = [1.16, 1.90], than within the poor target, B = 0.95, 95% CI = [0.62, 1.28]. 
Participants rated the happy-rich target higher on likability, M = 5.48, SD = 0.82, than 
the unhappy-rich target, M = 3.95, SD = 1.07. They also rated the happy-poor target 
higher on likability, M = 5.55, SD = 0.69, than the unhappy-poor target, M = 4.60, SD 
= 1.01. Looking at the interaction differently, the effect of target’s wealth was only 
significant for the unhappy target, B = -0.65, 95% CI = [-1.05, -0.26], but not for the 
happy target, B = -0.07, 95% CI = [-0.36, 0.23]. Participants rated the unhappy-rich 
target, M = 3.95, SD = 1.07, lower on likability than the unhappy-poor target, M = 
4.60, SD = 1.01, while for the happy target, they rated relatively similar and high level 
of likability regardless of their wealth.  
 
 
Figure 3: Target’s likeability as a function of the target’s happiness levels the target’s wealth, 
and participants’ levels of happiness 
 
Following Study 2, Hypothesis 1 alt (i.e., own-happiness moderation) was 
tested using a moderated moderation analysis (Model 3 PROCESS macro) for target’s 
happiness, target’s wealth and participants’ happiness on likability. Results show no 




conditions on likability, B = 0.05, 95% CI = [-0.31, 0.40]. Moreover, there was no 
evidence for the significant effects of two-way interactions between variables (all p’s 
> 0.05). In sum, Study 3 confirmed our hypothesis that a happy person is liked more 
than an unhappy person, although we found no support in this study for the 
similarity hypothesis (i.e. Hypothesis 1alt, see Fig 3). It is interesting to note that a 
rich person is liked less than a poor person, especially if he is unhappy.   
Target’s happiness levels, target’s wealth, participants’ 
happiness levels and envy toward the target 
Another moderated multiple regression using Model 1 PROCESS macro 
(v3.4) on the effect of the target’s happiness and wealth was conducted on envy as 
the dependent variable. The analysis revealed significant effects of the target’s 
happiness, B = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.35, 1.20], and the target’s wealth, B = 1.14, 95% CI 
= [0.70, 1.58], on envy. The happy target, M = 4.07, SD = 1.70, was envied significantly 
more than the unhappy target, M = 2.69, SD = 1.30, and the rich target, M = 4.24, SD 
= 1.61, was envied significantly more than the poor target, M = 2.49, SD = 1.18. These 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the target’s happiness and 
wealth, B = 1.32, 95% CI = [0.69, 1.96]. The conditional effects of the target’s 
happiness on envy was significantly stronger within the rich target, B = 2.10, 95% CI 
= [1.62, 2.57], than within the poor target, B = 0.77, 95% CI = [0.35, 1.20]. The happy-
rich target, M = 5.35, SD = 1.12, was envied more than the unhappy-rich target, M = 
3.25, SD = 1.30, and the happy-poor target, M = 2.88, SD = 1.22, was envied more 
than the unhappy-poor target, M = 2.11, SD = 1.01. Similarly, the effect of target’s 
wealth was significantly stronger within the happy target, B = 2.46, 95% CI = [2.01, 
2.92], than within the unhappy target, B = 1.14, 95% CI = [0.70, 1.58]. The happy-rich 
target, M = 5.35, SD = 1.12, was envied more than the happy-poor target, M = 2.88, 
SD = 1.22, and the unhappy-rich target, M = 3.25, SD = 1.30, was envied more than 
the unhappy-poor target, vs. M = 2.11, SD = 1.01.                                                        
We also tested the moderation by own happiness hypothesis using Model 
3 PROCESS macro (v3.4) and found a non-significant three-way interaction between 
target’s happiness, wealth and participants happiness on envy, B = -0.01, 95% CI = 
[-0.43, 0.40]. The two-way interactions between variables were not significant (p 
> .05). Thus, whereas overall participants displayed more envy towards happy than 
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unhappy targets, this effect did not depend on one’s own level of happiness. Again, 
we found support for the significant association between envy and liking toward the 
target, r(212) = .39, p < .001. = [-0.43, 0.40].  
In sum, Study 3 confirmed the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 that happy 
person is liked and envied more than unhappy person. These effects are significantly 
stronger within the rich than within the poor person, regardless of the happiness 




Figure 4: Envy toward the target as a function of the target’s happiness levels, the target’s 







by-emotion contagion susceptibility hypothesis  
To test the hypothesis that the effect of target’s happiness on liking is 
mediated by fear of emotional contagion toward the target, and that this mediation 
is moderated by participants’ emotional contagion susceptibility, we conducted the 
analysis in two steps. First, we tested whether there is an indirect effect of target 
happiness on liking through fear of emotional contagion. Similar to previous analyses, 
the dichotomous target’s happiness was coded as 1 (happy target) and 0 (unhappy 
target). A mediation analysis using Model 4 PROCESS macro with target’s happiness 
as the independent variable, fear of emotional contagion as the mediator, and 
likability as the dependent variable revealed that there was a significant indirect 
effect of fear of emotional contagion on the effect of target’s happiness on liking, B 
= 0.75, 95% CI = [0.53, 1.00]. The unhappy target evoked more fear of emotional 
contagion, M = 4.22, SD = 1.12, than the happy target, M = 2.72, SD = 0.92, B = -1.50, 
95% CI = [-1.77, -1.21], which in turn led to less liking toward the target, B = -0.50, 
95% CI = [-0.61, -0.40] (see Fig. 5). Thus, these findings provide support for the idea 
that unhappy targets are liked less because of the fear of emotional contagion. 
Second, we tested whether participants’ emotional contagion susceptibility 
moderates the effect of target’s happiness on fear of emotional contagion and on 
liking toward the target, by including emotional contagion susceptibility as the 
moderator. A moderated mediation analysis using Model 8 PROCESS macro revealed 
that the index of moderated mediation was not significant, index = -.02, 95% CI = [-
0.28, 0.28], and that there were no significant moderations of participants’ 
emotional contagion susceptibility on the effect of target’s happiness on 
fear of emotional contagion, B = 0.04, 95% CI = [-0.50, 0.57] as well as on 
liking toward the target, B = -0.11, 95% CI = [-0.50, 0.29]. Thus, participants 
disliked the unhappy target because they were afraid of being affected by 
the target’s unhappiness, and this occurred regardless of whether they had 
high (or low) susceptibility for emotion contagion.  
 
 




Figure 5: The moderated mediation of fear of emotional contagion and emotional contagion 
susceptibility on the effect of target’s happiness levels on target’s likeability 
 
In sum, the findings in Study 3 suggest that people like a happy person 
more than an unhappy person, and this superiority of happiness over unhappiness 
is true for both rich and poor targets. Interestingly, we found that a rich person is 
liked less than a poor person, especially if he is unhappy. Furthermore, findings 
suggest that people are also more envious towards a happy rather than an unhappy 
person and again, this is true for both rich and poor others. They are also more 
envious towards a rich rather than towards a poor person. If a rich person is happy, 
people appear even more envious. These findings support our prediction that people 
like and envy a happy person more than an unhappy person, largely regardless of 
the person’s wealth. Importantly, in Study 3 we found no support for the similarity 
hypothesis: participants liked a happy target more than an unhappy target, 
irrespective of one’s own level of subjective happiness. We also found no support for 
the prediction that envy towards a happy person should especially occur for people 
low in happiness themselves. Finally, the findings revealed a potential explanation of 
why people dislike an unhappy person, namely fear of emotional contagion. People 
are afraid to be influenced by a person’s unhappiness more than by a person’s 
happiness, therefore they tend to dislike the unhappy person.  
 


















Previous research demonstrated that people like happy others, as well as 
others who merely show expressions of happiness (e.g., Diener et al., 1995; Lau, 1982; 
Reysen, 2006; Schimmack et al., 2004). How robust and powerful is the effect of a 
target person’s happiness on liking? In three studies we consistently found that 
participants liked happy people more than unhappy people. This effect occurred 1) 
irrespective of own happiness level, and 2) it largely overrode the effect of the 
target’s physical health and wealth (as shown in Study 2 and Study 3, respectively). 
Results also showed that in addition to evoking liking, others’ happiness also led to 
envy. In three studies, we demonstrated that people experience benign envy towards 
(i.e., want to be similar to) happy others more than towards unhappy others. Unlike 
its effect on liking, the effect of others’ happiness on envy was moderated by the 
other persons’ physical health and wealth. Specifically, the level of happiness in a 
person only predicted envy when it concerned a non-disabled person (but not a 
disabled person). Moreover, a person’s happiness predicted envy more strongly in a 
rich person rather than in a poor person. Envy towards happy others was, unlike our 
prediction, not moderated by one’s own level of happiness. In short, these findings 
strongly suggest that people tend to like and envy happy others more than unhappy 
others, and the lack of moderation of these basic findings suggest that this is the 
case no matter what.   
In the introduction, we reasoned that the effect of others’ happiness on 
liking may be constrained by the similarity effect (i.e., own-happiness moderation 
hypothesis). However, the findings show insufficient and inconsistent support for this 
prediction: only in Study 2 we found some support in line with the similarity-liking 
hypothesis, but we did not replicate this finding in Studies 1 and 3. According to the 
information processing perspective of attraction (e.g., Ajzen, 1974; Kaplan & 
Anderson, 1973), people typically compare their own attributes with another person’s 
attributes. Attributes similar to their own are evaluated positively (Montoya & Horton, 
2013). Accordingly, dissimilar attributes are evaluated less positively and result in 
disliking (e.g., Stalling, 1970). This similarily-liking effect has been demonstrated for 
a large range of attributes (e.g., attitudes, personality characteristics, socio-economic 
background, physical attractiveness, preference for activities, music, religion, etc.).  
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Our findings suggest that this principle is less applicable to happiness. That 
is, whereas previous research has provided ample support for the similarity-liking 
association with regard to a range of traits and preferences (see Montoya et al., 2008, 
for an overview), the present findings provide an interesting exception to this basic 
similarity-leads-to-liking effect. Actually, these studies are not the only studies that 
did not find evidence for the similarity effect of happiness. Previous research on 
adolescence happiness (van Workum, et. al., 2013) found that adolescence do not 
form friendship based on happiness similarity between them.  
Perhaps it is not all that strange in light of the fact that that people consider 
happiness as an ultimate goal. People are naturally motivated to be happier (e.g., 
Howell, et al., 2016; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005), it is likely that unhappy 
people who encounter a happy other (i.e., a dissimilar other) somehow assign 
positive (instead of negative) valence to the other’s happiness. Conversely, when 
meeting an unhappy other (i.e., a similar other), unhappy people may assign negative 
(instead of positive) valence to this attribute, because they do not desire unhappiness 
themselves.  
Several hypotheses were explored to answer the question of why people 
like happy others and conversely, dislike unhappy others. We found support for the 
prediction that people worry about being affected by the emotions of unhappy 
people. Study 3 showed that fear of emotional contagion mediated the effect of the 
target’s happiness on liking. Specifically, participants anticipated that they would 
experience negative emotions (e.g., unhappiness) when meeting an unhappy target, 
and this anticipation led to less liking for the unhappy target. These findings are in 
line with previous findings on how people respond to depression. It has been 
demonstrated that depressed people induce negative affect in those who interacted 
with them and are rejected (Coyne, 1976a). van Workum and colleagues (2013) also 
found that adolescence may dissolve friendship with peers who are unhappier than 
themselves. According to Buunk and Ybema (2003), it is due to the dissatisfaction 
with the relationship that caused by unhappier friends’ mood. Moreover, people may 
hold general beliefs about how acceptable it is to experience negative and positive 
emotion. Positive emotions (e.g., happiness) are more socially valued and normative 
than negative emotions (e.g., depression, unhappiness; Bastian et al., 2012; 




appraise happy others more positively than unhappy others, as indicated by more 
liking for the happy others. 
The current findings also provide support for the notion that unhappiness 
may have detrimental consequences for interpersonal liking. Study 1 showed that 
the effect size when comparing the liking for unhappy versus neutral targets was 
twice as a large as the effect size when comparing happy versus neutral targets, 
suggesting that unhappiness evokes disliking more strongly than that happiness 
evokes liking. These findings provide support for the general principle of the greater 
power of bad over good (see Baumeister et al., 2001 for an overview). The “bad is 
stronger than good” principle suggests that the relative strength of bad over good 
is a basic and adaptive response of the human organism to its physical and social 
environment. An interesting question, is whether the level of another person’s 
happiness may be a reliable signal for the person’s willingness to cooperate or other 
possible beneficial outcomes (cf. Currie & Little, 2009). In this sense, perhaps 
heightened awareness of and a strong response to negative information such as 
others’ unhappiness may very well be a functional response. The fact that Study 3 
showed fear of emotion contagion as a driving mechanism between a target’s 
happiness level and liking is in line with the finding in Study 1 that particularly an 
unhappy target people were disliked.  
Inspecting the effect of happiness levels of people with different levels of 
physical health (i.e., non-disabled and disabled) and wealth (i.e., rich and poor) on 
envy, we found that the effect of the target’s happiness level was less strong than 
the effect of physical health and wealth. Study 2 results showed that the effect of 
others’ happiness on envy was only significant within a non-disabled target, such 
that a happy non-disabled person was envied more than an unhappy non-disabled 
person. However, a disabled person, even if he is happy, was envied less. Here we 
provide support for previous findings suggesting, not surprisingly, that disability is 
less desirable (e.g., Livneh, 1982; Vilchinsky, et al. 2010). Furthermore, the findings of 
Study 3 suggested that a person’s likability was strongly influenced by the persons’ 
wealth when it concerned an unhappy person rather than a happy person, such that 
a rich person is liked less than a poor person, especially if he is unhappy. In other 
words, while many people strive for wealth, these findings show that a wealthy 
unhappy person is disliked, suggesting that wealth without happiness is not desirable 
(cf. Whillans, Weidman, & Dunn, 2016). 
Liking and envy toward other’s happiness 
80 
Limitations and Future Research 
While the relation between a target’s happiness and target’s likeability may 
appear self-evident, previous research has not explicitly addressed the questions 
whether a target’s level of happiness affects liking, why this effect actually occurs, 
and whether this effect would occur irrespective of one’s own level of happiness. The 
present research provides initial answers to these questions.  
These findings, however, should be seen in light of a several limitations. We 
used brief descriptions of people rather than real people. Perhaps in real life, other 
factors and traits play an important role and may overrule happiness effects on liking. 
Similarly, an interesting but unaddressed question based on our findings is how 
people respond in an actual encounter with happy versus unhappy people. Do our 
findings imply that people would behave more negatively towards unhappy people? 
Moreover, some of the results may have been affected by social desirability. Given 
that some previous findings suggest that people perceive a norm to be happy in 
modern society (Kumalasari et al., under review), it could be that people give higher 
likability ratings to a happy target than to an unhappy target because they tend to 
conform with the norm in society. Relatedly, participants in our studies responded 
on explicit rating scales. It would be very interesting to examine implicit and less 
controllable responses to happy versus unhappy people.  
In the current research, the level of happiness was measured and 
manipulated as a relatively stable characteristic of participants and the target person. 
Whereas subjective happiness ratings tend to be fairly stable across time (e.g., 
Lyubormisky & Lepper, 1999, found test-retest correlations varying from .55 to .90 
with an average of .72, across a one-year period), happiness ratings and experiences 
also fluctuate, for example depending on current mood states (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983). We cannot be sure to what extent our findings were affected by current mood 
states, and thus to what extent evaluations of other people based on their happiness 
levels may fluctuate across time and situations. The current findings do suggest, 
however, that in any given situation, a happier target person tends to be evaluated 
more positively, independent of the perceiver’s current level of happiness (which 
could be influenced by one’s current mood state). Furthermore, the target person in 




For example, male participants might be more strongly influenced by the target’s 
level of happiness, as they may identify more strongly with the target person. Or, 
perhaps female participants may, on average, be more positive about a target person 
(cf. Cross & Morris, 2003) which could affect the interpretation of the results.  
However, as can be seen in the Supplementary Materials, controlling for participants’ 
gender, the effect of target’s happiness, health and wealth on liking and envy 
revealed very similar results. Nevertheless, an interesting question for future research 
is whether the present findings generalize across gender: are evaluations about 
women just as strongly influenced by their level of happiness, as we found in the 
present research for males? For example, some previous work indicates that gender 
stereotypes include that women tend to display more positive or happy emotions 
than men (Bijlstra et al., 2010). As a consequence, unhappy women who divert from 
this stereotype may be evaluated more harshly than unhappy men.  
Previous research on the similarity hypothesis has often used a method 
whereby a certain characteristic of the target person was experimentally matched 
with a characteristic of the participant (e.g., Byrne et al., 1969; Jamieson, Lydon, & 
Zanna, 1987; Steele & McGlynn, 1979). Arguably, this method may provide a stronger 
test of the similarity-liking hypothesis than the method we used, in which participants 
were randomly assigned to the different target person descriptions (as was done in 
various previous studies that tested the similarity liking hypothesis, e.g., Gattis, 
Simpson, Christensen, & Berns, 2004; Klohnen & Luo, 2003; Strauss, Barrick, & 
Connerley, 2001). 
Finally, participants in these studies were U.S. citizens and mostly White. 
Therefore, the findings may not generalize to non-U.S. samples and other ethnic 
groups, or across nations and cultures. Possibly, countries and cultures may differ in 
the extent to which happiness is a norm. Unhappy individuals may be particularly 
disliked in countries with a strong prevailing norm to be happy. Another interesting 
and somewhat related question is whether the frequency of use and exposure to 
social media may affect people’s evaluations of happy and unhappy others. People 
increasingly judge their own lives based on what they see on social media (e.g., Vogel, 
Rose, Roberts, & Eckles, 2014), and through increased social media use, happiness 
may become an even more central aspect in how people evaluate others. Whether 
and how social media and cultural norms about happiness affect how happy versus 
unhappy people are evaluated are very interesting directions for future studies. 
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Conclusion 
The present research provides empirical support for the idea that people 
desire happiness, not only for themselves but also in others. The happiness-liking 
effect is, apparently so powerful that even people who are unhappy like happy others 
more than unhappy others, and it does not make a difference how wealthy or healthy 
others are: another people’s happiness matters strongly in how we evaluate them.  
Supplementary Materials 
This supplementary document consists of detailed information on: 1) the 
target person’s description, 2) the results of Study 3 based on log transformed data, 
and 3) the results of the analyses to control for participants’ gender. 
The Target Person’s Descriptions 
To manipulate perceived happiness, physical health and wealth, we created 
several descriptions of a target person prior to examining our main hypotheses. We 
describe the detailed information on the target person’s description below. 
Study 1 
The target person’s descriptions consisted of 9 similar sentences describing 
his appearance (i.e. tall, dark hair, brown eyes), preference (i.e. likes wearing jeans 
and T-shirt, read and watch movies), living conditions (i.e. lives close to his office, in 
a small town with some parks and a pond), his regular activities (i.e. cycles to work), 
his regular feelings (i.e. sometimes cheerful and sometimes not so cheerful). The 
target person’s happiness levels were described by one sentence which differs in the 
happy (i.e. he is a very happy person) and the unhappy (i.e. he is not a very happy 
person) conditions, or by no information about the happiness level for the neutral 





A Description about Bob 
“Bob is a tall man. He has dark hair and brown eyes. He likes 
wearing jeans and T-shirts on his days off. He likes to read and 
watch movies. He lives close to his office, therefore he cycles to 
work. The town he lives in is not too big. It has some parks and a 
pond. He passes these parks when he cycles to work. Sometimes 
he is cheerful and sometimes he is not so cheerful. Overall, he is a 
very happy person.” 
Study 2 
We kept the structure of the target person’s descriptions in Study 1 to 
develop the descriptions for Study 2. The target person’s descriptions consisted of 7 
similar sentences describing his appearance, preference, living conditions, and his 
regular feelings. The target person’s physical health conditions were described by 
two sentences that differ in the non-disabled (i.e. cycles to work) and the disabled 
(i.e. goes to work in his wheelchair) condition. The target person’s happiness levels 
were described by one sentence that differs in the happy (i.e. he is a very happy 
person) and in the unhappy (i.e. he is not a very happy person) condition. As an 
example, the disabled-happy target description is shown below. 
A Description about Bob 
“Bob is a tall man. He has dark hair and brown eyes. He likes 
wearing jeans and T-shirts on his days off. He likes to read and 
watch movies. He lives close to his office and goes to work in his 
wheelchair. His hometown is not too big. It has some parks and 
a pond. He passes these parks when he rides his wheelchair to 
work. Sometimes he is cheerful and sometimes he is not so 
cheerful. Overall, he is a very happy person.” 
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Study 3 
Similar to Study 1 and Study 2, the target person’s descriptions consisted 
of 9 similar sentences describing his appearance, preference, living conditions, and 
his regular feelings. The target person’s wealth conditions were described by one 
sentence that differs in the rich (i.e., Bob makes a lot of money, he is rich) and the 
poor (i.e. Bob has difficulties to make ends meet, he is very poor) condition. The 
target person’s happiness levels were described by one sentence that differs in the 
happy (i.e. he is a very happy person) and in the unhappy (i.e. he is a not very happy 
person) condition. As an example, the poor-unhappy target description is shown 
below. 
A Description about Bob 
“Bob is a tall man. He has dark hair and brown eyes. He likes 
wearing jeans and T-shirts on his days off. He likes to read and 
watch movies. He lives close to the factory where he works, 
therefore he cycles to work. His hometown is not too big. It has 
some parks and a pond. He passes these parks he cycles to work. 
Bob has difficulties to make ends meet, he is very poor. Sometimes 
he is cheerful and sometimes he is not so cheerful. Overall, he is 
not a very happy person.” 
 
Results of Study 3 Based on Log Transformed Data 
The raw data of the studies are available at a public repository (i.e., the Open 
Science Framework; 
https://osf.io/92z3h/?view_only=d2056037373a46a281ad206f287e3d59). Prior to 
the main analysis, we conducted data screening procedures following Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007). These procedures revealed that in Study 3, the test of homogeneity 
of variances and homoscedasticity indicated unequal error variance of likability 




made the error variance of likability scores more homogenous and homoscedastic. 
We report the results of the transformed data analysis in the following paragraphs.  
A test for homogeneity of variance and heteroscedasticity was conducted 
on the raw data of Study 3. The Levene’s test indicated that the error variance of 
likability scores is unequal across conditions, F(3, 210) = 3.89, p = .01, and the 
Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the error variance depends on the values of the 
independent variables,  χ2(1) = 10.38, p = .001. Therefore, we conducted a log10 
transformation on the raw data. The error variance of the log-transformed data was 
more equal across conditions, F(3, 210) = 0,77, p = .51, and more homoscedastic, 
χ2(1) = 0.46, p = .50.  
Then, a two-way factorial ANOVA for target’s happiness and target’s wealth 
on likability was conducted on the log transformed data. Results showed significant 
main effect of target’s happiness, F(1,210) = 86.63,  p < .001, ηp2 = .29, and target’s 
wealth, F(1,210) = 4.83,  p = .03, ηp2 = .02. The group means resulting from the 
analysis were back-transformed for interpretation. The happy target, M = 5.63, 95% 
CI = [5.48, 5.78], was liked significantly more than the unhappy target, M = 4.44, 95% 
CI = [4.22, 4.65], and the rich target, M = 4.91, 95% CI = [4.66, 5.15], was liked less 
than the poor target, M = 5.24, 95% CI = [5.05, 5.41]. There was also a significant 
interaction between the target’s happiness and the target’s wealth F(1,210) = 4.18,  
p = .04, ηp2 = .02. Inspection of the simple effects shows a significantly stronger effect 
of target’s happiness within the rich target, F(1, 210) = 63.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 6.23, 
than within the poor target, F(1, 210) = 29.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Participants rated 
the happy-rich target higher on likeability, M = 5.63, 95% CI = [5.36, 5.86], than the 
unhappy-rich target, M = 4.10, 95% CI = [3.79, 4.40]. They also rated the happy-poor 
target higher on likeability, M = 5.64, 95% CI = [5.45, 5.82], than the unhappy-poor 
target, M = 4.76, 95% CI = [4.45, 5.04]. Looking at the interaction differently, the 
effect of target’s wealth was only significant for the unhappy target, F(1, 210) = 9.26, 
p = .003, ηp2 = .04, but not for the  happy target, F(1, 210) = .01, p = .92, ηp2 < .001. 
Participants rated the unhappy-rich target, M = 4.10, 95% CI = [3.79, 4.40], lower on 
likeability than the unhappy-poor target, M = 4.76, 95% CI = [4.45, 5.04], while for 
the happy target, they rated relatively similar and high level of likability regardless of 
their wealth (see Figure 1). 
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Hypothesis 1 alt (i.e., own-happiness moderation hypothesis) was tested 
using a moderated moderation analysis for target’s happiness, target’s wealth and 
participants’ happiness on likeability. The analysis was conducted using PROCESS 
macro (Hayes, 2013) on the log-transformed data. Results show no significant three-
way or two-way interactions between participants’ happiness and both target’s 
conditions on likability, B = .02, 95% CI = [-.07, .04]. Considering that the results of 
the log-transformed data analysis are in line with the results of the raw data analysis, 
we decided to report the results of the raw data analysis in the manuscript. 
 
 
Figure 1: Log-transformed target’s likability as a function of target’s happiness levels and 
target’s wealth 
Results of the analyses to control for participants’ gender 
In the present studies, the target person was described as male, which could 
raise potential limitation of the study. In order to examine whether the use of only 
male target affect the interpretation of the present results, we tested the first order 
effect and the higher order effects of participants’ gender on likability and envy 
throughout the studies. In Study 1, we conducted a 2 participants’ gender (female vs. 
male) x 3 target’s happiness (happy vs. unhappy vs. neutral) factorial ANOVA in SPSS 




analysis using Model 3 PROCESS macro in SPSS with participants’ gender as the 
moderator, target’s happiness and target’s health (or wealth) as the independent 
variables.  
Table 1, 2, and 3 show that across studies, the first order effect of 
participants’ gender was not significant. Participants’ gender contributed only a very 
small and insignificant amount of variance to the variability of liking and envy. These 
results suggest that across studies, female and male participants were not differ in 
assigning likability (M = 4.70, SD = 1.05 vs. M = 4.77, SD = 1.22, Study 1; M = 4.77, 
SD = 1.37 vs. M = 4.70, SD = 1.10, Study 2; M = 4.87, SD = 1.17 vs. M = 4.88, SD = 
1.08, Study 3) and envy scores (M = 3.37, SD = 1.45 vs. M = 3.41, SD = 1.36, Study 1; 
M = 2.77, SD = 1.50 vs. M = 3.00, SD = 1.56, Study 2; M = 3.18, SD = 1.75 vs. M = 
3.54, SD = 1.5, Study 3) to the (male) target person.  
 
Table 1 
The first order effects and the two-way interaction of participants’ gender by target’s 
happiness in Study 1 
 
DV Predictors Mean 
Square 
F df Sig. ηp2 
Likability Target’s happiness 29.19 38.06 (2, 109) .000 .42 
 Participants gender 0.02 0.03 (1,109) .875 .00 
 P_Gender*T_Happiness 1.26 1.65 (2, 109) .200 .03 
Envy Target’s happiness 26.35 17.59 (2, 109) .000 .24 
 Participants gender 0.12 0.08 (1,109) .776 .00 
 P_Gender*T_Happiness 3.12 2.08 (2, 109) .130 .04 
 
Moreover, these tables show that controlling for participants’ gender, the 
first order effect of target’s happiness, health, and wealth on liking and envy, as well 
as the two-way interaction of target’s happiness by target’s health or by target’s 
wealth were very similar to the present results as reported on the main text of the 
manuscript. Furthermore, across studies there were no significant two-way 
interaction of participants’ happiness by target’s happiness on likability and envy, 
except for a marginally significant effect of the two-way interaction on likability in 
Study 2 (see Table 2). In sum, we did not find consistent support for the idea that 
participants’ gender moderated any of the effects that we found.  
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Table 2  
The first order effects and the two-way interaction of participants’ gender by target’s 
happiness in Study 2 
 
DV Predictors Beta LLCI  ULCI 
Likability Target’s happiness (X) 1.60 1.32 1.87 
 Target’s health (M) 0.08 -0.19 0.36 
 X*M 0.38 -0.17 0.93 
 Participants gender (W) -0.16 -0.44 0.12 
 X*W -0.65 -1.20 -0.09 
 M*W 0.48 -0.08 1.03 
 X*M*W -.1.00 -2.11 0.11 
Envy Target’s happiness (X) 0.91 0.52 1.31 
 Target’s health (M) 1.29 0.90 1.68 
 X*M 0.98 0.20 1.77 
 Participants gender (W) 0.16 -0.24 0.55 
 X*W 0.36 -0.43 1.15 
 M*W 0.40 -0.39 1.19 
 X*M*W -1.41 -3.00 0.17 





The first order effects and the two-way interaction of participants’ gender by target’s 
happiness in Study 3 
 
DV Predictors Beta LLCI  ULCI 
Likability Target’s happiness (X) 1.24 0.99 1.49 
 Target’s wealth (M) -0.37 -0.62 -0.12 
 X*M 0.62 0.12 1.12 
 Participants gender (W) 0.03 -0.23 0.28 
 X*W -0.33 -0.82 0.17 
 M*W -0.04 -0.46 0.54 
 X*M*W -0.18 -1.18 0.82 
Envy Target’s happiness (X) 1.47 1.15 1.782 
 Target’s wealth (M) 1.78 1.46 2.10 
 X*M 1.35 0.72 2.00 
 Participants gender (W) 0.14 -0.17 0.46 
 X*W -0.20 -0.83 0.44 
 M*W 0.05 -0.58 0.68 
 X*M*W -1.55 -2.82 -0.29 





















Do People Choose Happiness? Anticipated 




 This chapter is based on: Kumalasari, A. D., Karremans, J. C., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2020). Do people 
choose happiness? Anticipated happiness affects both intuitive and deliberative decision-making. 
Current Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-020-01144-x 
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Abstract 
People make choices among different options for different reasons. We 
hypothesized that people will choose the options that they believe will make them 
happier and that this effect of anticipated happiness on decision-making will be 
moderated by style of thinking (i.e., intuitive or deliberative). In a two-phase online 
experiment, 15 pairs of options were randomly presented one at a time, and 
participants indicated the extent to which each option would contribute to their 
happiness (i.e. anticipated happiness of a choice option). One week later, participants 
were randomly assigned to make choices on similar pairs of options either by using 
deliberative thinking or intuitive thinking. Results of a linear mixed-effects model 
analysis revealed that anticipated happiness influenced choices significantly, 
however, this occurred independent of whether participants made the choice in a 
deliberative or in an intuitive mindset. The implications of these findings for 
understanding the association between decision-making and happiness are 
discussed. 
 
Keywords: anticipated happiness, thinking styles, affect-driven decision 




People naturally want to be happy (Howell et al. 2016; King & Napa, 1998). 
Indeed, several studies have demonstrated that happiness is rated as one of the most 
important goals across countries and cultures (King & Broyles 1997; King & Napa, 
1998; Diener & Oishi, 2004). While people differ in their idiosyncratic beliefs about 
happiness, lay beliefs about happiness tend to concur quite strongly with the 
scientific definition of happiness, that is a high level of life satisfaction, and the 
frequent experience of positive and infrequent experience of negative affect (e.g., 
Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith 1999; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade 2005). One of 
the reasons that people strive for happiness may be the fact that it is associated with 
many advantages, such as increased mental and physical health, superior work 
outcomes, and larger social rewards (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; Diener & Seligman 
2002).  
Given the importance people attach to happiness, it seems reasonable to 
expect that decisions that people make are for a large part driven by the anticipated 
happiness the choice or decision would bring, which we refer to as the anticipated 
happiness utility of a choice. That is, if an individual has to choose between options 
A and B, we could hypothesize that the person would choose option A if she believes 
that choosing option A would make her happier than choosing option B. It seems 
clear, however, that in real life people not always make optimal choices in terms of 
anticipated happiness utility, and in fact sometimes people make decisions that 
undermine happiness. For example, one may choose spending the weekend playing 
video games instead of spending it with family, even though one may have the 
knowledge that being with family will promote feelings of happiness. In the current 
study, we examined two related questions: First, do people make decisions based on 
anticipated happiness utility? And second, under what circumstances are people 
most likely to choose based on anticipated happiness utility? Specifically, and as will 
be explained in more detail shortly, we examined the hypothesis that anticipated 
happiness utility will determine people’s choice particularly if they choose intuitively, 
and less so when they choose in a more deliberative fashion.  
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Do people choose based on anticipated happiness? 
Emotion-based choice theory (Mellers & Mcgraw 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, 
& Ritov 1999) suggests that decisions are influenced by anticipated emotions. People 
often anticipate the pleasure or pain they might experience as a result of a decision. 
When having to make a choice, individuals imagine what it would feel like when 
choosing any of the given options. These anticipated emotions toward the options 
then guide the actual choice. That is, people choose the option with the highest level 
of subjective anticipated pleasure (e.g., Meller & Mcgraw 2001). People not only take 
anticipated pleasure into account, but also consider other emotions like regret and 
disappointment. For example, several studies demonstrated the impact of 
anticipated regret and disappointment on decision-making (Abraham & Sheeran, 
2004; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Previous research has found support for the 
function of anticipated emotions on decision-making in insurance decisions (Hsee & 
Kunreuther 2000), purchase intentions (Bagozzi, Belanche, Casaló, & Flavián 2016), 
risky decisions (Rottenstreich & Hsee 2001), and negotiations (Kong, Tuncel, & Parks 
2011).  
In addition to anticipating specific emotions of different choice options, 
people may make predictions about the impact a certain choice has on the overall 
sense of happiness it will bring (i.e., anticipated happiness utility of a choice). There 
is some previous support for this idea. Benjamin and colleagues (2012) presented a 
series of hypothetical pairwise-choice scenarios that emphasized a tradeoff between 
two options, and subsequently asked participants which of the options would make 
them happier (i.e., anticipated happiness question) and which option they think they 
would choose (i.e., choice question). For example, participants indicated for the 
options “sleep less but earn more” versus “earn more but sleep less” to what extent 
they thought which of these two options would make them happier, and then directly 
thereafter (i.e., in the same questionnaire) they indicated to what extent they thought 
they would choose one over the other option.  It was found that participants’ 
responses toward the anticipated happiness question coincided with the choices that 
they made, implying that indeed people choose based on the anticipated happiness 
utility of choice options. One aim of the current research is to see whether we can 
replicate these findings, using a similar paradigm (but with some notable differences 
as will be explained below).  
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When are people more, or less, likely to make choices based 
on expected happiness utility? 
As noted earlier, in real life people do not always make choices that indeed 
would result in more happiness. For example, many people invest most of their time 
on work and on gaining more money rather than on fostering relationships with a 
romantic partner, friends, and family, even though maintaining relationships with 
close others tends to be more strongly associated with happiness than money 
(Mogilner 2010). Similarly, while research shows that buying experiences generally 
results in more happiness than buying material goods (R. T. Howell & Guevara, 2013), 
people often tend to choose material goods rather than experiences. More generally, 
rather than making choices on anticipated happiness, people may choose based on 
certain general rules (e.g., Prelec & Herrnstein 1991). One example of such rules is 
the so-called ‘seek variety’ rule (Simonson 1990). Rather than choosing the option 
that is most preferred, and would probably bring more happiness, people tend to 
vary their choices simply for the sake of seeking variety (e.g., Simonson 1990). 
Moreover, people often may make choices based on norms, and based on what they 
believe is expected from them, rather than based on what would bring them more 
happiness (e.g., Dundes, Cho, & Kwak 2009).  
Hence, an interesting question is when people are more likely to make 
choices based on what makes them most happy, and when are they less likely to do 
so. This is the second aim we have in the current research. Specifically, we examine 
the hypothesis that when people choose intuitively, their choices will be guided more 
strongly based on the anticipated level of happiness of the choice. In contrast, when 
thinking carefully and deliberatively before making a choice, anticipated happiness 
of a choice may be less strongly predictive of the actual choices that people make. 
We based our hypothesis on dual-process theories of cognition and 
decision-making (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003, 2008, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). 
In a very broad sense, such theories suggest that people process information in two 
ways, “one variously labeled the intuitive, automatic, natural, nonverbal, narrative, 
and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational”, as 
suggested by Epstein (1994, p. 710). Research has shown that people have different 
preferences in using either intuitive or deliberative ways of thinking and decision-
making (Betsch, 2004; Kahneman, 2011). The preferred thinking strategy becomes a 
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habitual way of responding, and a stable preference for organizing and processing 
information and experience (i.e., cognitive styles) (Betsch & Kunz, 2008; Messick, 
1976). When choosing between different options, intuitive thinkers consider their 
initial affective reactions toward the options, while deliberative thinkers rely on a 
more careful analysis of the pros and the cons of the available options (de Vries et 
al., 2008).  
Intuitive thinking is thought to be closely related with the use of affect and 
heuristics in human decision-making and behavior. For example, according to Slovic 
and colleagues (2007), people may employ an “affect heuristic” to make decisions 
and judgments, which is a quick and intuitive assessment of “how do I feel about a 
possible choice?” We argue that anticipated happiness may serve as such an affect 
heuristic, and that intuitive thinkers would be especially likely to base their choices 
on anticipated happiness. People estimate which choice would make them most 
happy, and when choosing without too much deliberation (i.e. intuitively), this 
anticipated happiness information is used to actually make a choice. In contrast, 
when thinking deliberatively before making a choice, such affective information may 
be overruled by non-affective factors (e.g., de Vries et al., 2013; Phillips et al., 2016; 
Wilson & Schooler, 1991). For example, when thinking carefully before making a 
choice people may deliberate about normative aspects of the choice that could 
undermine the more affective influences (such as anticipated happiness) on a choice. 
Indeed, and in line with this general reasoning, research has shown that when people 
introspect on the reasons for making a particular choice, they tend to be less satisfied 
after making the decision, as compared to when they make a choice intuitively 
(Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2006; Wilson et al., 1993). This may suggest, as we predict, 
that when making a choice based on careful deliberation, people use or weigh 
anticipated happiness of the choice less strongly.  
The present research 
Thus, the present research examines two hypotheses, namely 1) that there 
is an effect of anticipated happiness on choice, and 2) that the effect of anticipated 
happiness on choice is stronger when people make their choices intuitively rather 
than deliberatively. We examined these predictions by having participants, in phase 
one, indicate the level of anticipated happiness for several choice options and then, 
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in phase two about a week later, indicate which of the options they would actually 
choose. Half of the participants did this choice task in phase 2 with the instruction to 
make choices intuitively, the other half was instructed to deliberately think about the 
choice options before making the choices. Aside from experimentally manipulating 
intuitive and deliberative thinking styles, we also measured individual differences in 
the preferred style of thinking. In sum, we expected that participants’ choices in 
phase 2 would be predicted by the anticipated happiness utility of the choice options 
as indicated in phase 1 (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we hypothesized that the effect 
of anticipated happiness on choice would be stronger in the intuitive versus 
deliberative condition (Hypothesis 2a), and would be stronger among participants 
with a higher self-reported dispositional preference for intuitive rather than 
deliberative thinking (Hypothesis 2b).  
Method 
Design 
We used a between-subjects design with thinking style (deliberative versus 
intuitive) as a categorical independent variable, anticipated happiness utility as a 
continuous independent variable, and choice as a continuous dependent variable. 
The experiment was pre-registered. The hypotheses, materials, and analysis plan for 
the study are accessible at the OSF, a public repository website (https://osf.io/63f2j). 
There are no significant deviations between the actual study and the pre-registered 
plan, except for the different terminologies used to indicate the variables1 and the 
actual syntax used to test the model. We mention the actual syntax in the data 
analysis section below. 
Participants  
A total of 150 adults were recruited in the first phase of the study from 
Prolific.ac, a subject pool for online studies. Only 141 participants returned for the 
 
1 In this manuscript, the term “anticipated happiness” was used to represent “expected 
contribution to happiness” in the pre-registered plan because the term is more commonly 
used in other literature.  
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second phase. Prior to data collection, the sample size was calculated based on a 
power analysis using PANGEA v0.2 (Westfall, 2016), an open-source web-based 
power application. According to Westfall (2016, p.23), a medium effect size of 0.45 
“represents a reasonable suggestion for most psychological studies if one has no 
other information about the specific effect to be studied”. Following this suggestion, 
we adopted this standard to calculate the sample size because we could not find an 
expected effect size in existing literature (e.g., Benjamin et al. 2012). Other 
parameters used for the sample size calculation are provided in Appendix A. The 
recruitment was stopped when we reached the predetermined sample size. One 
participant was excluded because he/she indicated not to use his/her data in a self-
reported measure for identifying careless participants (i.e., “In your honest opinion, 
should we use your data?”; Meade & Craig, 2012). Thus, 140 participants were 
included in the final analyses (38% male, age ranged 18 – 65 years old, M = 37.46, 
SD = 12.12).  
Participants were UK (81%) and the US (19%) citizens. 91% was Caucasian, 
6% Asian, 1% African, 1% Latino/Hispanic, and 1% belonged to other ethnicities. 37% 
was full-time employee, 22% part-time employee, 11% homemaker, 9% self-
employed, 7% student, 5% unemployed, 3% retired, and 6% other work. The 
educational backgrounds were 37% bachelor’s degree, 34% high school, 15% 
vocational education, 7% master’s degree, 7% other education. Their relationship 
statuses were 32% single, 30% in a relationship, 29% married, 6% divorced, 2% 
engaged, and 1% widowed.  
Procedures and Materials 
The procedures we used in the present research were adapted from 
Benjamin and colleagues (2012). Participants were requested to participate in a two-
phase online study. The first phase (i.e., the anticipated happiness of options) and 
the second phase (i.e., choice) were presented with an interval of 5 to 10 days. 
Participants received a total of £2 for their participation in the study. A general 
description of what was expected from participants was posted on www.prolific.ac. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. After providing informed 
consent, participants received the link to the first phase of the study.  
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In this phase, participants indicated their anticipated level of happiness for 
a number of choice options. Specifically, participants were presented with 15 pairs of 
options in random order. The options represented hypothetical life events in six life 
domains, that are found to be associated with happiness in previous studies (e.g., 
Diener & Fujita 1995; i.e., romantic relationship, health, leisure, money, friendship, 
and job). Each pair consisted of two options of which one was presented on the left 
side (i.e., Option A; e.g., “A warm date with someone you love”) and the other on the 
right side (i.e., Option B; e.g., “Exercise in your favorite gym”) of the computer screen.  
Participants responded to the following anticipated happiness question: 
“Between these two options, how much do you think one option would contribute to 
your happiness relative to the other one?”, using a 100-point slider by sliding the dot 
in the middle of the slider toward the most contributing option. The score of 0 
indicated that Option A (i.e., the one on the left side of the screen) contributed the 
most to happiness relative to Option B (i.e., the one on the right side of the screen), 
the score of 100 indicated that Option A contributed the least to happiness relative 
to Option B, and vice versa for Option B (see Appendix B for the complete pairs of 
options and anticipated happiness instruction). All choice options were presented in 
a randomized order, and the location of the options on the screen (left/right) was 
also randomized. 
After indicating the level of anticipated happiness for all choices in phase 1, 
participants reported their preference for decision-making style (i.e., 
intuitive/deliberative) on the Preference for Intuitive/Deliberative Scale (PID; Betsch, 
2004). The scale comprises of 9 items measuring preference for intuitive thinking 
(PID-I, i.e., “I listen carefully to my deepest feelings”), and 9 items measuring 
preference for deliberative thinking (PID-D, i.e., “Before making decisions I think 
them through”). Participants responded using 5-point Likert scale (1 = very much 
disagree, 5 = very much agree). PID-I and PDI-D showed adequate internal 
consistency (α = .78 and .77, respectively). Higher mean scores in PID-I indicated a 
stronger preference for intuitive thinking. Similarly, higher mean scores in PID-D 
indicated a stronger preference for deliberative thinking. Finally, participants filled 
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out some demographic questions (i.e. age, sex, educational, work, ethnicity 
background, and marital status)2.  
Five to ten days later, participants received an email directing them to the 
second phase of the study. In this phase, they were randomly assigned to either the 
intuitive condition (n = 69) or the deliberative condition (n = 71). Depending on the 
condition, participants received different instructions. Participants in the deliberative 
condition were instructed to “rely on a careful analysis to answer the following 
questions, and ignore any intuition or ‘gut instincts’ that might arise”. Participants in 
the intuitive condition were instructed to “use your gut feelings or intuition to respond 
to the following questions, rely on your first thought, and avoid thinking too much 
about it” (see Appendix C for the full instruction for the thinking style conditions).  
Next, participants were presented with the same choice options as in the 
first phase, and now responded to the following choice question: “If you were limited 
to these two options, how likely would you choose one option over the other?” Again, 
participants indicated their responses using a 100-point slider, by sliding the dot in 
the middle of the slider toward their choice. The score of 0 indicated that they would 
definitely choose Option A, and the score of 100 indicated that they would definitely 
choose Option B (see Appendix C for the full choice instruction).  
Finally, participants received a 5-item measure to check the validity of the 
manipulation (e.g., “I chose the option that felt right to me”, adapted from Dane et 
al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2017), indicating the extent to which they use deliberative or 
intuitive thinking when completing the choice task on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree, α = .79). Higher averaged scores indicated the use of 
more intuitive thinking style and lower averaged scores indicated the use of more 
deliberative thinking style. The duration of participants’ completion of the choice task 
was also recorded as an indirect measure of the manipulation effectiveness. We 
reasoned that participants would complete the task faster in the intuitive condition 
than in the deliberative condition. 
 
 
2 For exploratory reasons, we also measured several potential moderating variables on the 
relationship between anticipated happiness and choice, namely: subjective happiness, materialistic 
value orientation, and the pursuit of happiness. We reported the analyses and results of these 
variables in the supplementary material. 
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A self-reported measure to identify careless participants (i.e., “In your 
honest opinion, should we use your data?”; Meade & Craig 2012), and a short 
debriefing text about the study were presented at the end of the study. 
Data Analysis 
In total, the dataset consisted of 2100 observations, derived from responses 
of 140 participants to 15 pairs of options. Data were checked for outliers and 
multicollinearity prior to analysis. Inspection of the data revealed that there was an 
error in programming one pair of the option (i.e., pair number 14), and it was 
excluded from the analyses. After doing so, the dataset used for the analyses 
consisted of 1960 observations. Supplementary data can be found at the OSF 
(https://osf.io/vp6td/).  
Given that the 14 pairs of options (i.e., scenarios) were measured within 
participants (i.e., P_num), a linear mixed-effects model approach was used to analyze 
the following model: 
 
Choices ~ Happiness * conditions + (1 + Happiness | P_num) + 
(1 + Happiness | scenarios) 
 
This model estimates both fixed effects (i.e., the effect of the predictors: 
happiness and thinking condition, and their interaction, on the dependent variable: 
choices) and random effects (i.e., taking into account individual differences in 
participants’ response tendencies, and possible differences in scenarios). The data 
analysis was conducted in R (version 3.4.4, R Core Team, 2018), using the mixed() 
function of the afex package (version 0.20-2, Singmann et al., 2018). We followed the 
advice of Barr and colleagues (2013) to use a maximal random-effects structure for 
models where possible. The structure included by-participants and by-scenarios 
random intercepts and random slopes for the predictors varying within-participants 
and within-scenarios (i.e., anticipated happiness and conditions), as well as all 
correlation terms among the random effects. To measure the differences between 
intuitive and deliberative conditions, we used the sum contrasts (and accordingly 
Type III Sums of Squares) with deliberative condition as the reference category. To 
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determine p-values of overall effects we used the conditional F tests with Kenward-
Roger correction of degrees-of-freedom, as implemented in the Anova() function 
from the package car (version 2.1-6; Fox & Weisberg, 2018). 
Using a similar linear mixed-effects model, we tested the moderation of 
individuals’ preference for intuitive and deliberative thinking by entering PID-I scores 
and PID-D scores separately, replacing the conditions part in the model.  
Results 
Manipulation check 
To examine the effectiveness of the manipulation instruction of intuitive 
and deliberative thinking, we conducted an independent sample t-test with thinking 
style as the grouping variable and the mean of participants’ scores on the 
manipulation check as the test variable. Results show that participants reported more 
intuitive thinking when completing the task in the intuitive condition, M = 5.09, SD 
= 0.78, than participants in the deliberative thinking condition, M = 3.37, SD = 0.90, 
t(1936.7) = 45.29, p < .001. When we tested the effect of condition on the time spent 
to complete the task using a Mann-Whitney test, we found that participants in the 
intuitive condition, Mdn = 4.9 seconds per scenario, spent less amount of time on 
making decisions as compared to participants in the deliberative condition, Mdn = 
5.2 seconds per scenario, U = 441449.5, p = .002. These results indicated that 
participants both reported more intuitive thinking when completing the task in the 
intuitive condition, and indeed made faster decisions, than participants in the 
deliberative thinking condition.  
The effect of anticipated happiness and thinking styles on 
choice 
The linear mixed-effects model testing, as described in the data analysis 
section, revealed a significant main effect of anticipated happiness on choice, F(1, 
22.42) = 392.41, p < .001. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the more participants 
believed that an option would contribute to their happiness, the more likely they 
were to choose the option.  
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Contrary to hypothesis 2a, the relationship between anticipated happiness 
and choice was not significantly different in the intuitive condition and in the 
deliberative condition, F(1, 126.16) = 0.04, p = .84. For completeness, we report that 
the main effect of thinking style on choice was not significant, F(1, 137.73) = 0.51, p 
= .48, but note that this main effect is arbitrary (i.e., it simply indicates whether or 
not condition is associated with being more likely to choose the left or right options). 
Similarly, contrary to hypothesis 2b, we did not find support for the moderation of 
the measured preference of thinking styles (i.e., PID-I, F(1, 111.44) = 1.19, p = .27, 
and PID-D, F(1, 121.45) = 1.33, p = .25). Thus, irrespective of experimentally 
manipulated or self-reported decision-making style, participants based their choices 
on the anticipated happiness of the choice options.  
Discussion 
Do people choose based on what they believe makes them happy? And if 
so, does the extent to which people do so depend on their (manipulated or preferred) 
intuitive versus deliberative thinking style? The present study replicates the finding 
of Benjamin and colleagues (2012), demonstrating that when making choices, 
participants were inclined to choose the option that they believed would bring them 
more happiness (i.e., the option with the highest level of anticipated happiness). 
Interestingly, however, we found no evidence that this tendency was moderated by 
making choices in an either intuitive or deliberative mindset (in fact, as can be read 
in the online resource, the anticipated happiness effect on choice was not moderated 
by any of the factors that we measured additionally, including the level of happiness 
of the participant, materialistic values, or tendency to pursue happiness). In short, the 
current findings indicate that people’s choices are directed by the extent to which 
they expect that the choices will bring more happiness, irrespective of how the 
choices are made.  
The current research findings provide additional evidence for the literature 
on emotion-based choice (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). Previous research 
suggests that decisions are influenced by anticipated specific emotions, like regret 
or disappointment that might result from a decision (e.g., Abraham & Sheeran, 2004; 
Richard et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). In addition to such previous findings, 
our results suggest that decisions are influenced by anticipated happiness. An 
Anticipated Happiness and Choice 
104 
explanation for our findings could be derived from the subjective expected pleasure 
theory (Mellers et al., 1999; Mellers & Mcgraw, 2001). According to this theory, 
people often make an estimation of the pleasure or pain a future action will bring. 
We reason that, in our study, when participants were presented with the hypothetical 
life events, they anticipated the pleasure or the pain they would experience as a result 
of choosing each of the available options, which gives them a general sense of how 
happy or unhappy choosing a certain option would make them. They then chose the 
option they thought would maximize happiness.  
The present findings seem to further underline the importance of happiness 
in people’s lives. That is, the findings suggest that people do make choices based on 
what they believe would make them more happy (i.e., anticipated happiness). For 
many if not most people, the desire to be happy is more important than other goals 
(Diener, 2000; Myers, 2000), and this striving for happiness is supported by many 
research findings suggesting that people can actually do something to become 
happier (Lyubomirsky & Layous 2013; Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006). Anticipating the 
level of happiness a certain choice would bring, and choosing based on this 
estimation, is potentially an effective strategy that people use to optimize happiness 
levels.   
Importantly, in the current research, we did not find that intuitive or 
deliberative thinking style (nor any other factors; see online resource), weakened the 
link between anticipated happiness and choice. This raising the interesting question: 
what factors possibly would cause people to make choices that do not make them 
happy? First, although not examined here, one important factor may be social norms 
that may undermine the effect of anticipated happiness on choice. In the current 
research, participants made their choices arguably without being influenced by social 
norms. They made their choices online and anonymous, and the choices were 
hypothetical. However, in real-life decisions, people may consider social norms to a 
varying degree when making decisions. In other words, they may choose based on 
what a social norm dictates rather than on what makes them happy. As an interesting 
example, research demonstrates that people choose to stay in a romantic 
relationship that makes them unhappy because they believe it is the norm to stay in 
the relationship, and leaving the relationship may result in social disapproval (e.g., 
Etcheverry & Agnew, 2004). Thus, future research may examine whether social norms 
moderate the relationship between anticipated happiness and choice.  
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Several scholars have suggested that the relationship between the style of 
thinking and decision-making is stronger when the attributes of the decision task 
matches the characteristics of the style of thinking (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; 
Epstein, 1994; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). To give an example, Inbar and colleagues 
(2010) demonstrated that the nature of the decision-making task induces people to 
use either deliberative or intuitive processing styles. For example, when making a 
preferential choice (i.e., choosing between different options, as was the case in the 
present study), people tend to use an intuitive decision-making style, whereas people 
tend to use a deliberative style if a choice is perceived as objectively evaluable (i.e., 
a decision that is evaluated against an objective standard). An interesting topic to 
investigate in the future is whether the association between anticipated happiness 
and choice may be weaker in decision-making tasks that require more deliberation.  
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the present 
findings.  First, we presented hypothetical choice options to the participants and 
asked them to make hypothetical choices, so that there were no real consequences 
of their choices. This may have discouraged participants to be strongly engaged in 
the task, and results may change if participants were presented with real options (i.e., 
choices that are relevant to their personal life or that result in real consequences). 
We acknowledge that this is an important limitation, as perhaps the anticipated 
happiness effect that we find here is inflated as compared to the role of anticipated 
happiness in real life. As noted above, in real life concerns like norms should become 
more salient when the choices have actual consequences, and can be perceived and 
‘judged’ by others. Future research should replicate the present findings for actual 
real-life choices, and examine potential moderators of the role of anticipated 
happiness in making actual choices.   
Second, even though participants in the deliberative (versus intuitive) 
condition did report that they engaged in more deliberation, and indeed took more 
time to make a decision, probably this still does not reflect the amount of 
deliberation that people engage in when making a choice in real life. It is likely that 
more deliberative thinking is required to overwrite the effects of anticipated 
happiness on choice, as we predicted.  Thus, even though that we found converging 
(null) evidence that both individual difference measures and an experimental 
manipulation did not affect the role of happiness in decision-making at all, future 
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research needs to try stronger manipulations of thinking style, in combination with 
actual rather than hypothetical choices.  
Finally, participants were instructed explicitly to reflect on the anticipated 
happiness of a choice option, which in itself may have influenced their subsequent 
choice. For example, the anticipated happiness question may have served as a ‘prime’ 
for the choice. With regard to this point, our study arguably is a methodological 
improvement to the Benjamin and colleagues (2012) study, in which participants 
responded to the anticipated happiness, and to the choice question right after each 
other, whereas in our study there was at least five days in between the anticipated 
happiness question and the choice. Still, we do not know to what extent in real life 
people spontaneously make an estimation of the happiness outcomes of a choice 
before they actually make a choice.  
Conclusion 
The present research found the effect of anticipated happiness on choice, 
irrespective of participants’ way and preference of thinking (and irrespective of 
subjective happiness, materialistic value, and pursuit of happiness; as shown in the 
online supporting materials). In other words, we did not find support that any 
seemingly relevant personality characteristic, nor an induced decision style, 
weakened (nor strengthened) the influence of anticipated happiness on the choices 
that participants made. Although these findings should be considered in light of 
some limitations, they are consistent with the general idea that happiness is a 
prominent driver in the lives of most people. It is our hope that the present results 
form a springboard to further examine this topic. 
 
Supplementary Material 
The research reported in this chapter were testing the hypotheses that 
people will choose the options that they believe will make them happier, and that 
this effect of anticipated happiness on decision making will be moderated by 
people’s style of thinking (i.e., intuitive or deliberative). In addition to testing the main 
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hypotheses, we tested whether the relationship between anticipated happiness and 
decision making is moderated by several individual difference measures, such as 
subjective happiness, the pursuit of happiness, and materialistic value orientation. In 
this document, we briefly inform the readers about the individual difference 
measures, data analyses and the results. We refer the readers to the manuscript for 
the detailed report on the study design, participants, and procedures that have been 
used in this research.  
First, we examined the moderating effect of subjective happiness. If people 
make choices based on anticipated happiness, it can be argued that, when making 
choices, happier people would rely on the anticipated happiness more strongly than 
less happy people. Perhaps happy people are happy precisely because they use the 
extent to which an option would make them most happy as a reference for making 
choices. In contrast, less happy people may be unhappy because they base their 
choices on something else than the anticipated happiness of options (e.g., norms).  
Second, we explored the effect of people’s pursuit of happiness. Although 
most people want to be happy, they are different in the degree to which they value 
happiness and take action to pursue it (e.g., Ford et al., 2015). Lyubomirsky and 
colleagues (2005) show that a short-term happiness-enhancing activity (e.g., 
performing act of kindness, counting one’s blessing) can increase happiness. It can 
be argued that people who are likely to pursue happiness would choose based on 
anticipated happiness more so than people who are less likely to pursue happiness. 
Finally, we explored the effect of materialistic value orientation. We used 
the Love of Money Scale (Tang, et al., 2006) as a proxy of materialistic value 
orientation. People scoring high in the Love of Money Scale have more wishes to be 
rich, are more motivated by money, and believe in the importance of money. Several 
studies on the relationship between materialistic/money orientation and well-being 
shows that people who had strongly internalized materialistic values reported lower 
happiness (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Moreover, being overly focused on money or 
being overly concerned with financial success are associated with lower well-being 
(Tatzel, 2002). Perhaps, people with high level of love of money (i.e., strong 
materialistic values) are more likely to base their choices on what makes them rich 
or brings them more money. We thus explored whether the effect of anticipated 
happiness on choice would be less strong in this group of people. 




Participants reported their subjective happiness using the Subjective 
Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper 1999) which consists of four items. 
Participants indicated their perception of their level of happiness on a 7-point Likert 
scale (e.g., “In general I consider myself (1) not a happy person to (7) a very happy 
person”; α = .89). A higher level of subjective happiness was indicated by higher 
averaged scores.  
To measure the motivation to pursue happiness, we used the Pursuit of 
Happiness Scale (Kumalasari, Karremans, & Dijksterhuis, under review) which consists 
of 9 items. Participants indicated their level of agreement with 5 statements (e.g. “I 
spend most of my time trying to be happy”), that could be scored on 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; α = .84). A stronger motivation to 
pursue happiness was indicated by higher averaged scores. 
Materialistic value orientation was measured using the Love of Money Scale 
(LoMS; Tang et al., 2006) which consists of 9 items representing three latent 
constructs: wanting to be rich (i.e., “I want to be rich”), money as a motivator (i.e., “I 
am highly motivated by money”), and importance of money (i.e. “Money is good”). 
The scale uses a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly 
agree; α = .89) for the responses. Higher level of love of money was indicated by 
higher averaged scores.  
Data analysis 
To test the moderation of participants’ subjective happiness, the pursuit of 
happiness, and materialistic value orientation on the relationship between 
anticipated happiness and choice, we performed a series of linear mixed-effects 
models. The model includes the within-subject anticipated happiness, each of the 
within-subject proposed moderator, and their interactions as the independent 
variables, and choice as the dependent variable. We included the Bonferronni’s 
method of controlling for multiple testing, because we conducted in total of 5 
hypothesis testing (including the analyses for the moderation of preference for 
Chapter 4  
109 
4 
intuitive and deliberative thinking reported in the manuscript). Using this method, 
we decided to reject null hypothesis if the minimum p ≤ α/3 (p ≤ .02).   
 
Table 1 
Results of moderation analysis for the proposed moderators  
 
Predictors df’s F p 
Happiness (1, 22.33) 394.29 < .017* 
SHS (1, 138.90) 3.39 .07 
Happy*SHS (1, 127.42) 0.32 .58 
Happiness (1, 22.58) 409.30 < .017* 
PH (1, 138.19) 4.45* .04 
Happy*PH (1, 113.38) 0.95 .33 
Happiness (1, 22.34) 390.98 < .017* 
LoMS (1, 139.29) 0.10 .76 
Happy*LoMS (1, 112.78) 0.32 .57 
Note: Happiness, anticipated happiness; SHS, subjective happiness, LoMS, attitude toward 
money; PH, pursuit of happiness. *alpha significance level was established using Bonferroni 
method of controlling for multiple testing to ≤ .017 (p ≤ .05/3). 
 
Results 
Consistently, we found significant main effects of anticipated happiness on 
choice (all p’s < .017; see Table 1). The main effects of each proposed moderator 
were not significant (all p’s > .04). Most importantly, as presented in Table 1, there 
were no significant interactions between anticipated happiness and any of the 
proposed moderators on choice (all p’s > .17). Thus, irrespective of one’s level of 
happiness, the pursuit of happiness, and materialistic values, participants based their 
choices on the anticipated happiness of the choice options.  
Discussion 
In the current research, we did not identify any of the factors that 
theoretically may weaken the link between anticipated happiness and choice: neither 
people’s subjective happiness, tendency to pursue happiness, or materialistic value 
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orientation. These findings seem to underline the superior effect of anticipated 
happiness on decision making. The theoretical and societal implications of these 
findings are discussed in the manuscript.  
Ethical Approval 
All procedures performed in the study involving human participants were 
following the ethical standards of the institutional research committee (The Ethics 
Committee, Faculty of Social Sciences, Radboud University, reference number 
18U.004781) and the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or 
comparable ethical standards. 
Data Availability Statement 
The raw data and the R script for analyses are available at a public repository 




























The present dissertation aimed to investigate some of the implications of 
the general notion that happiness is considered important to most people. 
Specifically, the studies reported in this dissertation were designed to examine the 
relation between a perceived happiness norm, happiness pressure, happiness pursuit, 
and subjective happiness; the relation between levels of others’ happiness and 
evaluation toward others in terms of liking and envy; and the relation between 
anticipated happiness and choice. In this chapter, I briefly summarize the major 
findings, and discuss some broader implications of the present dissertation.  
Overview of the Findings: Is Happiness 
Important? 
The studies presented in this dissertation suggest that happiness is indeed 
very important, and that this has various consequences. In Chapter 2, I addressed the 
question whether perceiving happiness as a norm is related to the tendency to 
pursue happiness and the level of subjective happiness. I tested these relationships 
in four countries that endorse either more collectivistic or more individualistic 
worldviews. Supporting the social norms literature (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 
1991; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000), results revealed that participants across 
countries generally agreed that there is a norm to be happy1. Various relationships 
between the perceived happiness norm and other variables were found across 
countries. For example, in the Netherlands, China and Indonesia (but not in The 
United States) a happiness norm was positively related to subjective happiness. In 
other words, the more people perceived that there is a societal norm to be happy, 
the more happiness they actually reported. In all countries but the Netherlands, a 
happiness norm was positively related to the pursuit of happiness. Moreover, in the 
United States and China the relation between the happiness norm and subjective 
happiness was mediated by the pursuit of happiness. Interestingly, in all countries 
 
1 Although it was not reported in Chapter 2, results revealed that the mean scores of the happiness 
norm scale for all countries were higher than 5.0 on a 7-point Likert scale (MUS = 5.51, SDUS = 1.05; 
MNL= 5.10, SDNL = .96; MIN = 5.0, SDIN = .88; MCH= 5.50, SDCH= .99), indicating that on average 
participants across countries generally agreed that they perceived a norm to be happy in their society. 
These results were not reported in Chapter 2 because the main aim of the study was not for 




the perception of happiness as a pressure was associated with lower subjective 
happiness, and in the United States this relationship was mediated by a diminished 
pursuit of happiness. In general, these findings may suggest that a perceived 
happiness norm may lead people to pursue happiness and actually become happier. 
However, an experience of societal pressure to be happy may undermine the pursuit 
of happiness and decrease happiness.  
In Chapter 3 I focused on the question whether a target person’s level of 
happiness is related to the extent to which people like and envy that person, and 
whether this relationship is moderated by the level of happiness of the one who is 
judging (i.e. the evaluator). Based on the similarity principle  (Byrne, 1961; Montoya 
et al., 2008) it could be  argued that happy people would evaluate happy others more 
positively as compared to unhappy others, and that unhappy people have a relative 
preference for unhappy people. Results of three experimental studies showed that 
participants based their evaluation toward others, in terms of liking and envy, on the 
other persons’ levels of happiness. Contrary to the similarity principle, happy people 
were liked and envied more than unhappy people, regardless of whether the 
evaluators were happy or unhappy themselves. Furthermore, the effect of the target 
person’s happiness on liking and envy was overriding the effect of the target person’s 
health and wealth. Happy people (as compared to unhappy people) were more 
likeable irrespective of their health and wealth, and were more envied especially 
when they were healthy and rich. Importantly, results revealed that a target persons’ 
unhappiness was evaluated negatively and that fear of emotional contagion was 
driving the effect, such that people like unhappy others less because they fear being 
contaminated by the persons’ unhappiness. Thus, findings in Chapter 3 suggest that 
people not only desire happiness in themselves, but also in others, and in fact, that 
they want to avoid unhappy others in order to maintain their own happiness.  
In Chapter 4 I turned to the question whether people base their choices on 
the level of happiness they believe a choice option would bring (i.e., anticipated 
happiness), and whether this would depend on whether decisions are made 
intuitively or deliberatively. Based on the dual information processing literatures 
(Evans, 2010; Kahneman, 2011), it has been argued that anticipated happiness may 
act as an “affect heuristic” that guides intuitive thinkers when making choices, so that 
intuitive thinkers base their choices on anticipated happiness more than deliberative 
thinkers. Results revealed that participants based their choices indeed strongly on 
Discussion 
116 
anticipated happiness, however, this was independent of whether they made the 
choice in a deliberative or in an intuitive mind-set. Furthermore, the effect of 
anticipated happiness on choice was so strong that it overrode any possible effects 
of people’s current level of happiness, materialistic values, or tendency to pursue 
happiness. In sum, the findings in Chapter 4 imply that people choose the options 
that maximize happiness indicating that they desire happiness so much. 
Each of the reported studies has limitations which are already discussed on 
the Discussion section of each chapter. I summarize the most common limitations of 
the studies. First, the studies used self-report measures to assess participants’ 
individual differences such as subjective happiness. This may distort participants’ 
responses, such that participants may respond in a particular direction (i.e., positive, 
negative, moderate, or extreme) regardless of the content of the test variable, and 
participants may consciously or unconsciously create a certain impression (i.e., social 
desirability responding) (Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). Perhaps these biases, 
particularly social desirability responding, affect participants’ responses, and 
interestingly, it may do so especially in a society that strongly perceives the norm to 
be happy. For example, participants’ scores on the subjective happiness scale may 
be inflated because they consciously or unconsciously tried to create an impression 
that they are happy, in conformity to the norm. Second, the studies in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 used hypothetical person descriptions and options of life situations as 
experimental manipulations. These stimuli may not perfectly capture real life people 
and situations. It is likely that participants respond differently when they are 
presented with stories of real persons or options that are directly relevant to their 
life situation and have real consequences. In real life, people may take into 
consideration other matters such as norms when they evaluate others or make 
choices.  
Although the findings in this dissertation should be considered in light of 
such limitations, together the findings are consistent with the general notion that 
happiness is very important and has some potentially important downstream 
consequences: happiness is perceived as a norm in society, and these perceptions 
are related to the tendency to pursue happiness and actual subjective happiness. 
Moreover, happiness plays an important role in how people evaluate others, and 





All things considered, the findings imply that the desire to be happy 
underlies what we do, how we judge others, and what choices we make. Below I 
underline some implications these findings may have on the social psychological 
literature on happiness, social norms, person judgment, and decision making. Also, 
in this section, regarding these implications, I will discuss several possibilities for 
future directions.  
 
Happiness, Social Norms, and Cultures 
The findings in Chapter 2 suggest that participants across four countries 
perceived a norm to be happy on average degrees. This implies that happiness 
indeed is perceived as a norm in these societies. Social psychology research on social 
norms typically focuses on intervention studies to promote certain positive 
behaviours, such as pro-environmental (e.g., green behaviour, Elgaaied-Gambier et 
al., 2018) and health behaviours (e.g., anti-smoking, Dono et al., 2020); fast-food 
consumption, Van Rongen et al., 2020). The present findings suggest that research 
on social norms may consider the happiness norm as a new field of study to explore 
the causes and consequences of the happiness norm. For example, in line with the 
previous findings on norm-intention associations and norm-behaviour associations 
(see Fischer et al., 2019 for review), the present study provided initial support for the 
happiness norm - happiness pursuit link and the happiness norm - subjective 
happiness link. Thus, future research should examine the causal relationship between 
the happiness norm and happiness pursuit, which may affect individual’s subjective 
happiness. In general, it would be interesting to see whether the perceived happiness 
norm follows the same principles as other societal norms in motivating people to 
follow the norm.  
The study in Chapter 2 has also shown that the associations between the 
happiness norm, happiness pursuit and subjective happiness vary significantly but 
not consistently across individualistic and collectivistic countries (cf., Fischer et al., 
2009; Hofstede et al., 2010). It has been repeatedly found that the effects of a societal 
norm on behaviour and behavioural intentions are stronger in more collectivistic 
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cultures (Fischer et al., 2019). For example, results from two large international 
samples suggest that in collectivist cultures people are influenced by the perceived 
normative desirability of life satisfaction when appraising their life satisfaction, while 
in individualist cultures people rely more on their private feelings (Suh et al., 1998). 
However, the present findings show that a significant relationship between the 
happiness norm and happiness pursuit may also be observed in an individualistic 
country such as The United States (the 1st rank among 76 countries on the 
Individualism Index Values/ IDV; Hofstede et al., 2010), while it was not the case in 
The Netherlands (the 6th rank on the IDV). Perhaps, in search for a consistent 
explanation on the role of culture in the happiness norm, happiness pursuit and 
subjective happiness link, future research may consider to measure the cultural 
dimensionality at individual levels (i.e., Fischer et al., 2009), and examine whether the 
individual difference level of cultural dimensions would moderate the happiness 
norm - happiness pursuit relationship. A good example of such research has been 
conducted by Suh and colleagues (2008). In the studies, they measured and primed 
individuals’ self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), examined its role on life 
satisfaction judgments, and found that differences in self-construal processes 
underlie cross-cultural differences in life satisfaction judgments.  
Furthermore, the search for the link between the happiness norm and 
subjective happiness may as well be expanded to the other approach of happiness, 
namely eudaimonic well-being. According to the eudaimonic perspective, happiness 
is defined by external criteria, in terms of possessing desirable qualities such as virtue 
(Aristotle), self-realization (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Waterman, 1993), and meaningfulness 
(McGregor & Little, 1998). These qualities are prescribed as the normative standard 
to judge people’s lives (Diener, 1984). The studies in the current dissertation asked 
participants to subjectively evaluate their happiness using their own definitions or 
standards. In general, participants reported a moderate level of subjective happiness 
and a moderate level of perceived happiness norm. Perhaps, these responses would 
be different when they are exposed to the normative standards of being happy as 
suggested by the eudaimonic perspective of happiness. Similar to the findings 
presented in Chapter 2, it would be interesting to examine whether societal norms 
about virtues would actually lead to more virtuous behaviour in people, and whether 





To date, very little is known yet about how societal norms about happiness 
are being perceived, what determines them, and how they may affect people’s 
happiness. These may raise questions such as what individual and cultural factors are 
associated with the happiness norm, whether the excessive use of social media leads 
to frequent or intense perception of happiness norm, and what the implications of 
these relationships are. Moreover, it important to know whether a happiness norm 
could actually benefit society and whether there is an optimum amount of perceiving 
a happiness norm so that it would benefit society, and not turn into happiness 
pressure. The fact that the happiness norm can be reliably measured in different 
cultures opens an opportunity to explore the experience of a social norm to be happy 
in different societies and examine the role of cultural differences on how people 
respond to the happiness norm.  
Happiness and person judgment 
Despite the robust effect of similarity-attraction theory (Byrne, 1961), three 
experimental studies in Chapter 3 repeatedly found no significant evidence to 
support this phenomenon in the domain of happiness. Similarly, previous research 
on adolescence friendship network and happiness (van Workum et al., 2013) found 
that adolescents do not form friendships based on happiness similarity between 
them. However, they do end friendships with peers who were dissimilarly happy (i.e., 
unhappier or happier than themselves). These findings suggest that two persons’ 
similar levels of happiness do not influence the extent to which these persons like or 
attracted to each other. Apparently, unlike many other traits, happiness seems a 
‘special’ case for which the similarity hypothesis does not apply. Notably, however, 
more research is needed, and future research should investigate the effect of 
happiness similarity in different contexts.  
Importantly, the studies in Chapter 3 suggest that an unhappy person is 
evaluated negatively because people experience a fear of emotional contagion. 
Similar results have been reported by van Workum and colleagues (2013) where they 
suggest that adolescents dissolve friendships with their unhappier peers because 
such friends’ moods trigger dissatisfaction with the relationship and increase the 
chance of ending it (Buunk & Ybema, 2003). Indeed, they found that adolescent 
friends influenced each other’s happiness over time (to the direction of more and 
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less happy) and became more similar in happiness. An interesting question is 
whether such findings might depend on happiness norms in society, as I studied in 
Chapter 2. In societies with stronger happiness norms, one could argue that unhappy 
people divert even more strongly from the norm, and may be evaluated even more 
negatively. Integrating the research methodologies from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
would be able to address this issue in future studies.  
Happiness and decision making 
Arguably, most decisions in life are driven by the pursuit of happiness (Hsee 
& Hastie, 2006). The study presented in Chapter 4 supports this notion by 
demonstrating that people’s choices are highly affected by their prediction of the 
extent to which the available options make them happy. Also, this study contributes 
to the emotion-based choice theory (Mellers & Mcgraw, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, & 
Ritov, 1999) by adding the effect of anticipated happiness on choice to the literature. 
Although previous research has found that often people fail to maximize happiness 
due to several systematic biases (see Hsee & Hastie, 2006 for review), the study in 
Chapter 4 did not find factors related to information processing in decision making 
(e.g., intuitive or deliberative thinking styles) that weakened the link between 
anticipated happiness and choice. Future research should explore other aspects of 
decision-making processes that may cause people to make choices that do not 
promote but actually undermine happiness, as is often observed in daily life.  
Practical Implications 
The findings presented in this dissertation may have several potential 
practical implications. First, from the normative perspective in Chapter 2, it is may 
actually be a good thing to perceive happiness as a norm. Perceiving a norm to be 
happy may actually increase happiness since it may lead us to pursue happiness more 
(while, of course, it may also be the case that people higher in happiness may 
perceive a happiness norm more strongly as a result of their own happiness). 
Paradoxically, the study also shows that when happiness is perceived as a pressure, 
it may backfire and actually undermine our happiness. This phenomenon has also 




relationship between happiness norm, happiness pressure and subjective happiness, 
it may be important for policy makers and governments to promote the happiness 
norm, so that people take good care of themselves, but in such a way that it does 
not turn into pressure, especially for people who deviate from the norm (e.g., 
unhappy people). Finding this balance between promoting a happiness norm versus 
happiness pressure seems an important societal challenge. 
Second, social media seems to have an obvious role in initiating the 
experience of a happiness norm and happiness pressure. For example, people tend 
to present the most positive sides of their lives on social media (Nadkarni & Hofmann, 
2012) so that a social media user may believe that his or her own life is not as happy 
or as good as the lives of friends and others (Chou & Edge, 2012). This unfavourable 
social comparison can undermine happiness by lowering self-esteem (Shakya & 
Christakis, 2017). Given the effect of social comparison in social media on happiness, 
perhaps there should be guidelines or a movement to motivate people to be more 
mindful when using social media, and to create awareness that posting only “the 
good stuff” actually may contribute to an atmosphere of happiness pressure.  
Third, to what extent do expectations of others play a role in creating a 
norm or a pressure to be happy? Previous research suggests that when people 
perceive a social expectation that they should feel happy, they actually feel sad more 
frequently and intensely, and feel more lonely (Bastian et al., 2012, 2015). Such 
expectations may for example play a role for people with certain professions (e.g., 
psychologist, comedians, entertainers, mindfulness trainers, priests, monks, etc.), as 
they might be expected to be happier than the average person. How does this social 
expectation affect these groups of people? It would be interesting to see whether for 
people in such professions that are stereotypically linked with happiness, the 
happiness norm may be experienced as pressure, paradoxically undermining their 
happiness. More generally, the happiness norm may be stronger for some people in 
society than for others, and may actually be perceived as pressure, simply because 
others expect them in particular to be happy.  
Fourth, in addition to the happiness norm as shown in Chapter 2, based on 
Chapter 3, we could argue that there is prejudice against less happy people since 
less happy people are evaluated less positively, and happier people more positively. 
What is the implication of the negative evaluation of unhappy people? Our findings 
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may suggest that unhappy people will be less likely to get support, be isolated or 
stigmatized (e.g., Ozmen et al., 2004), while they are the ones who actually are more 
in need of support and care. Interventions to foster public awareness of the need to 
alter people’s attitudes toward unhappy others are needed to build a more caring 
society.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Finally, Chapter 4 suggests that our choices are heavily influenced by the 
level of happiness we predict the choice may bring. However, in real life people are 
not always good at predicting what makes them happy and sometimes people make 
choices based on other reasons (e.g., rules) (Hsee & Hastie, 2006), even when 
knowing that it undermines happiness. For example: While I’m writing this 
dissertation, most people around the world are staying at home because of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Especially in Indonesia which is known as a collectivistic country 
(rank 70th among 76 countries on IDV; Hofstede et al., 2010), spending time with 
significant others (i.e., parents, family, friends), celebrating cultural festivities, and 
attending religious worships with other cultural/religious members generally induces 
more happiness. However, people are restricted and discouraged to do so because 
of the health and safety measures. In this real-life situation, what would people 
choose? Would they choose based on what makes them happy (i.e., going out to see 
significant others and pray in mosques or churches) rather than staying at home for 
safety? I observed that many people choose to stay at home but some people choose 
go out for attending religious worships and travel to their hometown for celebrating 
religious festivities. It is clear from this example that anticipated happiness may not 
be the only factor that influence people’s choices, and an important challenge for 
future research is to uncover the factors that determine people to make choices that 
actually undermine their happiness.  
General conclusion 
The results of the studies presented in this dissertation reveal that striving 
for happiness has important implications for the lives of many people. It is suggested 
by the findings that happiness has become a norm in society, influences how people 
evaluate others, and affects the choices people make. Specifically, the norm to be 
happy is positively associated to the tendency to pursue happiness and the 




he/she is perceived as likable and being envied by others independent of the 
person’s health and wealth; and the level of anticipated happiness of an option is 
highly associated with the likelihood of choosing the option regardless of the 
decision maker’s intuitive/deliberative mind-set. On the other hand, some people 
may perceive a pressure to be happy and this perception is associated negatively to 
the tendency to pursue happiness and subjective happiness; and finally, people tend 
to dislike unhappy others, and this relationship is mediated by the fear of being 
affected by the other’s unhappiness. These findings suggest the importance of 
studying happiness through different theoretical views in social psychology, such as 
social norms, person judgment, and decision making, in order to obtain a better 
understanding of the role happiness plays in many aspects of human functioning. 
This dissertation ads a few pieces of the puzzle in happiness research, and hopefully 
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Nobody wants to be hungry, thirsty or sick. Everybody wants to be full and 
healthy, live a satisfying and calm life without being overwhelmed by worry and fear. 
Naturally, humans seek for the bodily pleasure along with the peace of day, avoiding 
as best as possible physical pain and mental anxiety. Instinctively, everybody seeks 
happiness and avoids suffering.  
People desire happiness so much so that it is sought in various ways and in 
various places in the course of human history.  Happiness is utilized as a goal that 
serves as a measuring tool for assessing the quality of social institutions (e.g., The 
World Happiness Report; Helliwell et al., 2020). It is recognized as a universal goal of 
human being around the world and is emphasized as a public policy objective 
(United Nations, 2012). It is clear that happiness is considered important to the life 
of many people around the world. 
I seek to contribute to the research on happiness that has been rising in the 
past decades by addressing a broad question regarding the implications of the 
importance of happiness in people’s lives. In this dissertation, I suggest that there 
are at least three areas of psychological functioning that may be influenced by the 
desire to be happy that is shared by many people.   
First, by becoming a societal goal in modern societies, the desire to be 
happy has been made salient in people’s daily lives. Therefore, it is likely that 
happiness has become a norm in society. People believe that they ought to be happy 
as a result of the emphasis on happiness through public policy, social media, and 
daily life interactions. Chapter 2 shows that in a large sample from the United States, 
the Netherlands, China and Indonesia perceived the norm to be happy (i.e., the 
believe that people should be happy) in their society on average degrees. Moreover, 
the perception of the happiness norm is associated with people’s subjective 
happiness, at least in the Dutch, Chinese, and Indonesian samples. The more people 
perceive that there is a societal norm to be happy, the more happiness they report, 
and vice versa. This association was mediated by the pursuit of happiness in the 
American and Chinese samples. The findings suggest that the more people perceive 





As much as the society’s emphasis on happiness may motivate individuals 
to pursue happiness and consequently be happier, the emphasis may also put some 
pressure on some people. From the samples of four countries (i.e., The United States, 
The Netherlands, China and Indonesia) I learned that there are people who perceived 
a pressure to be happy (i.e., the negative feelings or thoughts toward the compulsion 
to be happy). More importantly, these samples consistently associated the pressure 
to be happy with lower subjective happiness across countries. Although only 
evidenced in the United States, the findings show that the more people perceive the 
happiness pressure, the less they pursue happiness, and the less happy they are. 
These findings imply that the emphasis of happiness in society may not only bring 
positive consequences on people’s subjective happiness but also negative 
consequences, such as pressure and lower levels of happiness. 
Second, the desire to be happy seems to affect how people evaluate others. 
Naturally, we would predict that people will evaluate happy others more positively 
than unhappy others. Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence for this intuitive 
prediction by showing a significant effect of another person’s happiness on liking 
and envy toward that person. Interestingly, this effect occurs irrespective of the 
happiness levels of the evaluators. These findings imply the important of happiness 
in people’s lives, such that people tend to evaluate happiness in others positively, 
even when they are not happy themselves.  
Looking at these findings differently, it is important to note that 
unhappiness is evaluated negatively. People dislike unhappy others even when they 
are unhappy themselves. The third study in Chapter 3 shows that this effect is driven 
by fear of emotional contagion, such that people like unhappy others less because 
they fear to be influenced by the persons’ unhappiness. These findings imply that 
people desire happiness not only for themselves but also for others and tend to 
maintain their happiness by avoiding unhappy others. Of course, these predictions 
should be further examined.    
Third, the desire to be happy may also affect people’s decision making. 
Given that happiness is considered important for the life of many people, it is 
reasonable to expect that people will choose options that would bring more 
happiness. However, in real life people do not always make choices that result in 
more happiness. Perhaps, as other research found, when making decision in everyday 
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life, people base their decision on various considerations, such as rules and (e.g., 
Prelect & Herrnstein, 1991) norms (e.g., Dundes, et al., 2009), rather than on the 
amount of happiness an option would bring. The study reported in Chapter 4 shows 
that, when making a decision, people tend to anticipate the extent to which each 
available option would bring happiness and choose the one that they thought would 
maximize happiness. Interestingly, this strong effect of happiness on decision making 
is not moderated by any personality characteristic or induced decision style. The 
findings suggest that happiness is a prominent driver of people’s decision-making 
process. 
In conclusion, through a series of studies, the findings reported in this 
dissertation expand the research field of happiness by examining its effects on 
different areas of psychological functioning such as social norm, person perception, 
and decision making. These findings suggest that the importance of happiness 
impacts on whether society views it as a norm, influences how people evaluate others, 



























Iedereen wil een gezond, vredig en gelukkig leven leiden zonder 
overweldigd te worden door zorgen en angst. Mensen zoeken lichamelijk en mentaal 
genot, en vermijden zo goed mogelijk lichamelijke pijn en mentale angst. Instinctief 
zoekt iedereen geluk en vermijdt hij of zij lijden. 
Mensen verlangen zozeer naar geluk dat het op verschillende manieren en 
op verschillende plekken in de menselijke geschiedenis werd gezocht.  
Tegenwoordig wordt geluk gemeten om de kwaliteit van sociale instituties te 
beoordelen (bijvoorbeeld The World Happiness Report; Helliwell et al., 2020). Het 
wordt erkend als een universeel doel van mensen in de hele wereld, en wordt 
benadrukt als een doelstelling van overheidsbeleid (Verenigde Naties, 2012). Het is 
duidelijk dat geluk als belangrijk wordt beschouwd voor het leven van mensen over 
de hele wereld. 
In dit proefschrift probeer ik een bijdrage te leveren aan het onderzoek naar 
geluk door een brede vraag te stellen wat de implicaties zijn van het belang van 
geluk in het leven van mensen. Ik suggereer dat er minstens drie gebieden van 
psychologisch functioneren zijn die beïnvloed kunnen worden door het verlangen 
om gelukkig te zijn dat door veel mensen wordt gedeeld.   
Ten eerste, doordat geluk een maatschappelijk doel lijkt te zijn in moderne 
samenlevingen, is het verlangen om gelukkig te zijn zeer saillant in het dagelijks leven 
van mensen. Daarom is het waarschijnlijk dat geluk een norm in de samenleving is 
geworden. Mensen geloven dat ze gelukkig moeten zijn als gevolg van 
overheidsbeleid, sociale media en interacties in het dagelijks leven welke het belang 
van geluk benadrukken. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat in een grote steekproef uit de 
Verenigde Staten, Nederland, China en Indonesië de norm voor geluk (d.w.z. het 
geloof dat mensen gelukkig zouden moeten zijn) inderdaad ervaren wordt. 
Bovendien wordt de perceptie van de geluksnorm geassocieerd met het subjectieve 
geluk van mensen, althans in de Nederlandse, Chinese en Indonesische steekproeven. 
Hoe meer mensen ervaren dat er een maatschappelijke norm is om gelukkig te zijn, 
hoe meer geluk ze rapporteren. Deze associatie werd statistisch gemedieerd door 
het streven naar geluk in de Amerikaanse en Chinese steekproeven. Deze 
bevindingen suggereren dat hoe meer mensen de geluksnorm ervaren, hoe groter 
de kans is dat ze geluk nastreven en hoe gelukkiger ze op hun beurt zijn.  
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Hoewel de maatschappelijke norm voor geluk mensen kan motiveren om 
geluk na te streven en dus gelukkiger te zijn, kan deze geluksnorm ook druk leggen 
op sommige mensen. In de steekproeven van vier landen (de Verenigde Staten, 
Nederland, China en Indonesië) vond ik dat er mensen zijn die een zekere dwang 
voelen om gelukkig te zijn (de negatieve gevoelens of gedachten ten opzichte van 
de dwang om gelukkig te zijn). Belangrijker nog is dat deze steekproeven de druk 
om gelukkig te zijn consequent in verband brachten met een lager subjectief geluk.  
De bevindingen laten bovendien zien dat dat hoe meer mensen de geluksdruk 
waarnemen, hoe minder ze het geluk nastreven en hoe minder gelukkig ze zijn, 
hoewel dit alleen in de Verenigde Staten werd aangetoond. Deze bevindingen 
impliceren dat de nadruk op geluk in de samenleving niet alleen positieve gevolgen 
kan hebben voor het subjectieve geluk van mensen, maar ook negatieve gevolgen, 
zoals druk en lagere geluksniveaus. 
Ten tweede lijkt het verlangen om gelukkig te zijn van invloed te zijn op de 
manier waarop mensen anderen beoordelen. Over het algemeen zouden we 
voorspellen dat mensen gelukkige anderen positiever zullen beoordelen dan 
ongelukkige anderen. Hoofdstuk 3 biedt empirisch bewijs voor deze intuïtieve 
voorspelling door een significant effect te laten zien van het geluk van een ander op 
de voorkeur voor en jaloezie ten opzichte van die persoon. Interessant is dat dit effect 
zich voordoet ongeacht het geluksniveau van de beoordelaars. Deze bevindingen 
impliceren het belang van geluk in het leven van mensen, zodanig dat mensen de 
neiging hebben om het geluk van anderen positief te beoordelen, zelfs als ze zelf 
niet gelukkig zijn.  
Het is belangrijk om op te merken dat de bevindingen bovendien lieten zien 
dat men name ongelukkig zijn negatief wordt beoordeeld. Mensen lijken een 
bepaalde aversie te hebben ten opzichte van ongelukkige anderen, zelfs als ze zelf 
ongelukkig zijn. De derde studie in hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat dit effect wordt 
gedreven door angst voor emotionele besmetting, zodat mensen minder van 
ongelukkige anderen houden omdat ze bang zijn om beïnvloed te worden door het 
gebrek aan geluk van de andere persoon. Deze bevindingen impliceren dat mensen 
niet alleen naar geluk verlangen voor zichzelf maar ook voor anderen, en ernaar 
streven om hun eigen geluk te behouden door ongelukkige anderen te vermijden. 
Deze voorspellingen moeten verder worden onderzocht in vervolgonderzoek.    
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Ten derde kan het verlangen om gelukkig te zijn ook invloed hebben op de 
besluitvorming van mensen. Gezien het feit dat geluk als belangrijk wordt 
beschouwd in het leven van veel mensen, is het redelijk om te verwachten dat 
mensen zullen kiezen voor opties waarvan de verwachting is dat die meer geluk 
zouden brengen. In het echte leven maken mensen echter niet altijd keuzes die 
leiden tot meer geluk. Misschien, zoals uit ander onderzoek is gebleken, baseren 
mensen hun beslissing in het dagelijks leven op verschillende overwegingen, zoals 
regels (bijv. Prelect & Herrnstein, 1991) en normen (bijv. Dundes et al., 2009), in plaats 
van op de hoeveelheid geluk die een optie zou opleveren. De studie die in hoofdstuk 
4 wordt gerapporteerd toont aan dat mensen bij het nemen van een beslissing de 
neiging hebben om te anticiperen op de mate waarin elke beschikbare optie geluk 
zou brengen, en vervolgens te kiezen voor de optie waarvan ze dachten dat die het 
geluk zou maximaliseren. Interessant is dat dit sterke effect van geluk niet werd 
beïnvloed (of statistische gemodereerd) door enig persoonlijkheidskenmerk of een 
experimenteel geïnduceerde beslissingsstijl. De bevindingen suggereren dat geluk 
een prominente drijfveer is voor het besluitvormingsproces van mensen. 
Door middel van een serie studies breiden de bevindingen in dit 
proefschrift het onderzoeksveld van geluk uit door het onderzoeken van de effecten 
ervan op verschillende gebieden van psychologisch functioneren, zoals een 
waargenomen sociale geluksnorm, persoonsperceptie en besluitvorming. Deze 
bevindingen suggereren dat het belang van geluk van invloed is op de vraag of de 
samenleving het als een norm ziet, invloed heeft op de manier waarop mensen 
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